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A RACE OR A NATION? CHEROKEE NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND THE STATUS OF
FREEDMEN'S DESCENDANTS
S. Alan Ray*
Critics of tribal sovereignty increasingly point to perceived contradictions between the
egalitarian ideals of modem democracies and the citizenship criteria of Indian
nations to argue for diminished tribal sovereign immunity and increased federal
intervention in Indian affairs. When tribal nations employ citizenship criteria based
on Indian ancestry, they may be asked to explain why they are not engaging in
immoral, if not unlawful, race-based discrimination. Assertions of tribal sovereignty
alone, even when well-founded in the law, do not address how tribes should
determine citizenship criteria from within their own norms and values.
The Cherokee Nation recently faced the challenge of determining its citizenship
criteria as they pertain to the descendants of the Cherokee Freedmen. As former
slaves of Cherokee citizens, the Freedmen were adopted by the Nation after the
Civil War and given full rights of Cherokee citizenship consistent with the terms of
a Reconstruction treaty. The incorporation of the Freedmen into the tribe was
resisted from the start. When the Cherokee Nation's highest court affirmed the
Freedmen's descendants' citizenship rights in 2006, the Nation called a special
election, and on March 3, 2007, voted to approve a constitutional amendment
imposing an "Indian blood" requirement for citizenship based on the federal Dawes
Rolls of the allotment era. If the amendment stands, thousands of African-
descended citizens will be eliminated from the tribal registry. In this Article,
Professor Ray examines the legal and social history of the Cherokee Freedmen to
criticize definitions of Cherokee political identity based on either the Dawes Rolls or
notions of "Indian blood." Both, he argues, are heteronymous authorities for
determining tribal citizenship criteria and should be replaced by the critical
hermeneutic of indigenous cultural resources. The wise use of sovereignty, he
suggests, requires sustained dialogue between Freedmen's descendants and
Cherokees by "blood," not the quick-fix of the political process.
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INTRODUCTION
The Cherokee Nation' stands at a crossroads. On March 7, 2006, the
Nation's highest court in Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation reversed itself and
ruled that the descendants of former slaves owned by Cherokee citizens-
the Cherokee Freedmen-were citizens of the Nation under its Constitu-
tion of 1975.2 The Court's decision provoked immediate and strong
1. Hereinafter "the Cherokee Nation" or "the Nation." The entity is also known
popularly as "the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma."
2. Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04-09, 19 (Okla. Trib. Mar.
7 2006), available at http://www.cherokee.org/docs/news/Freedman-Decision.pdf [here-
inaftier "Lucy Allen"], rev'g Riggs v. Ummerteskee, JAT-97-03-K (Okla. Trib. Aug. 15
2001), available at http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/pdf/RiggsVs_UmmerteskeeJAT97
_03_-K.pdf.
"Constitution" when capitalized refers to the Constitution of the Cherokee Nation.
"Court" when capitalized refers to the Judicial Appeals Tribunal (JAT), the supreme court
of the Nation.The Lucy Allen Court addressed itself to the document variously referred to
as the "the 1975 Constitution" or "the 1976 Constitution." The same document was ap-
proved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on September 5, 1975, and was ratified by
the Cherokee people on June 26, 1976. Cherokee Nation Tribal Government, http://
www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=government. This Article will refer to "the 1975
Constitution" in deference to the Court's preferred term. At the time the Court decided
Lucy Allen, the Cherokee Nation had popularly approved a new organic document, drafted
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reaction from tribal leadership, Freedmen's descendants, and many of the
Nation's citizens. On June 12, 2006, the Tribal Council passed a resolution
to amend the Constitution to grant citizenship only to Cherokees (or
their descendants) with a degree of Cherokee "blood" or adopted Dela-
wares or Shawnees (or their descendants) with a degree of Delaware or
Shawnee "blood" as determined by the Dawes Rolls.3 The amendment
required approval by a majority of Cherokee voters, and following a suc-
cessful initiative petition, a special election on the amendment was held
on March 3, 2007. 4 By a clear majority, the amendment was approved!
African Americans who trace their ancestry to the Cherokee
Freedmen felt keenly the exclusionary effects of the Nation's action and
anticipated their expulsion from the tribe's political life. The Nation per-
formed its sovereign right to establish its citizenship criteria, therefore, in
a social context marked by racial division. At issue was whether the
Cherokee Nation should legally exclude members, present and future,
who have no demonstrable "Indian blood," and more fundamentally,
whether the political identity of the Cherokee Nation should center on
biology or law.
This Article examines the Cherokee Freedmen controversy to assess
whether law and biology can function as sufficient models for crafting
Cherokee identity at this crucial moment in the tribe's history. I will ar-
gue that while law and biology are historically powerful frames for
establishing tribal self-identity, they are inadequate to the task of deter-
mining who should enjoy national citizenship. The wise use of
sovereignty, I will suggest, lies in creating a process of sustained dialogical
engagement among all stakeholders in the definition of Cherokee citizen-
ship on the question of Cherokee identity. This dialogue should ideally
after constitutional convention in 1999 (hence "the 1999 Constitution") and approved by
referendum in 2003. However, because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had not ap-
proved the 1999 Constitution, the Lucy Allen Court was operating under the 1975
Constitution.The 1999 Constitution does not address itself to the status of the Freedmen's
descendants and makes no substantive change to the 1975 Constitution regarding criteria
for citizenship. See The 1999 Constitution of the Cherokee Nation: A Review and Com-
parison between the 1976 and 1999 Constitutions of the Cherokee Nation in
Preparation for the Ratification Vote On July 26, 2003, http://www.cherokee.org/
TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/cccl999Changes.pdf [hereinafter "Comparison of
the 1976 and 1999 Constitutions"] (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
3. A Resolution Proposing an Amendment to Article III, Section I of the Cherokee Nation
Constitution of 1975 and Article IV, Section 1 of Cherokee Constitution of 1999 Pursuant to Article
15, Section 2, Determining Criteria for Citizenship Into the Cherokee Nation/R#63-06,in MIN-
UTES OF TRIBAL COUNCIL MEETING-REGULAR SESSION, MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2006,
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Legislative/Onine/images/JUNE-12-2006-
egular-TCM-Minutes.pdf.
4. SPECIAL ELECTION 2007 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, http://www.cherokee.org/
TribalGovernment/Election/home.aspx?section=faq-special&year=2007.
5. Cherokee Nation Special Election Results, Cherokee Nation News Release,
http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=story&id=FGOzZCl+mNE=.
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have been undertaken before the Nation moved to the political solution
of a vote on tribal citizenship criteria. The exclusion of the Freedmen's
descendants without such a dialogue may have high political and social
costs to the Nation, its members, and its apparently former members. The
dialogue I propose could be constructed along the lines suggested by so-
ciologist Eva Garroutte, whose model of Radical Indigenism offers one
means of considering these complex issues from within the Cherokee
community itself.
I will begin by providing an overview of the Court's decision in
Lucy Allen, the response of the Tribal Council in seeking to amend the
Constitution, and the vote of the Nation's citizens on the amendment
itself. I will then examine the adequacy of legal and biological definitions
to establish Cherokee identity in the context of the Freedmen contro-
versy. Finding both inadequate to this larger task, I will present the
alternative of Radical Indigenism and explore how it could be a resource
for the tribe in resolving the current crisis of Cherokee identity.
I. LucYALLEN AND THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY
On March 7, 2006, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the Cherokee
Nation issued its long-awaited opinion in the case of Lucy Allen. In a 2-1
decision, 6 the supreme court of the second-largest Indian nation in the
country ruled that descendants of freed slaves of the Cherokee
("Freedmen")7 were entitled to citizenship. Cherokee Freedmen were
African-descended people who had been owned by Cherokees until their
emancipation by the Nation in 1863.8 Under the terms of the Treaty of
1866 reconciling the Cherokees with the United States, the Nation
agreed to adopt the Freedmen as citizens and amended its Constitution
accordingly.9 Many Freedmen and their descendants, though not all, were
listed on the Final Rolls of the Dawes Commission which were, and are,
the exclusive means by which to establish Cherokee Nation citizenship.0
Petitioner Lucy Allen "is a descendant of individuals listed on the
Dawes Commission Rolls as 'Cherokee Freedmen.' , Allen sought a dec-
6. Lucy Allen,JAT-04-09 (Dowry, J., concurring; Matlock,J., dissenting).
7. In this Article "Freedmen" refers to the freed slaves themselves. I indicate their
descendants separately ("Freedmen and their descendants"). Conventional denotation
often uses "the Freedmen" to refer alternately to the historically emancipated class of per-
sons and to their descendants, allowing context to make clear which group is meant.
8. The Cherokee National Council had emancipated all slaves "within the limits of
the Cherokee Nation" in 1863. DANIEL F LITTLEFIELD, JR., THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN:
FROM EMANCIPATION TO AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 16 (1978).
9. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
11. Lucy Allen,JAT-04-09 at 1.
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laration that language in the Cherokee statutes requiring that citizenship
be "derived only through proof of Cherokee blood' 1 2 was unconstitu-
tional "because it is more restrictive than the membership criteria set
forth in Article III of the 1975 Constitution."'3 Article III, Section 1 of
the 1975 Constitution provides:
[A]ll members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as
proven by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls, includ-
ing the Delaware Cherokees of Article II of the Delaware
Agreement dated the 8th day of May 1867, and the Shawnee
Cherokees as of Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated
the 9th day ofJune, 1969, and/or their descendants.
14
All parties agreed that the Freedmen and their descendants, if they
appeared on the Dawes Rolls, were "citizens" prior to the enactment of
the 1975 Constitution. The Dawes Rolls consist of multiple rolls whose
pages (apropos the Nation) are captioned, "Cherokee by Blood," "Minor
Cherokees by Blood," "Cherokee Freedmen," "Minor Cherokee
Freedmen," "Delaware Cherokee" and "Intermarried Whites.' The
Nation argued that the voters intended to exclude the Freedmen and
therefore no mention of them was made in Article III. The Court
rebutted that argument, noting that Article III was also silent on the
inclusion of Cherokees by "blood," yet no one would argue that they
were excluded from citizenship. In fact, the 1975 Constitution makes no
legal distinction among the different Dawes Rolls and therefore does not
single out for tribal citizenship only those who appear or whose
descendants appear on a roll of Indians by "blood." Consequently, the Lucy
Allen Court held that the Freedmen and their descendants did not lose
their citizenship as a result of the adoption of the 1975 Constitution and
subsequent legislation imposing a "blood" requirement for tribal
12. 11 C.N.C.A. § 12(A) (1993).The Court also struck down on the same grounds
11 C.N.C.A. § 12(B), which states, "The Registrar will issue tribal membership to a per-
son who can prove that he or she is an original enrollee hsted on the Final Rolls [Dawes
Rolls] by blood or who can prove to at least one direct ancestor hsted by blood on the
Final Rolls." 11 C.N.C.A. § 12(B) (1993).
13. Lucy Allen,JAT-04-09 at 1.
14. CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION art. III, § 1 (1975).
15. Because the Cherokee Nation had agreed to the federal government's request
after the Civil War to adopt as citizens Shawnee and Delaware tribal members, there are
also separate pages captioned "Delaware Cherokee," while Shawnee are included on the
Cherokee by Blood roll and indicated accordingly. Lucy Allen, JAT-04-09 at 7. Thus it is
possible from the Dawes Rolls to determine to a legal if not moral certainty who is a per-
son with "Indian blood" and, by the principle of exclusion, who is not. Under the
taxonomy of tribal citizenship established by the Dawes Rolls it is not necessary to have
"Cherokee blood"-the cases of the Shawnee and Delaware, intermarried Whites, and
Freedmen demonstrate that legal relationships of adoption or marriage are sufficient to
qualify one (and one's descendants) for citizenship.
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citizenship was unconstitutionally restrictive. The Court made clear that
the Dawes Rolls are the touchstone for all Cherokee political rights:
"[T]he 1975 Constitution affirms these rights by linking citizenship to
one single document: the Dawes Commission Rolls."'
7
As a result of the Lucy Allen decision, as many as 45,000 people of
African descent became eligible to be added to a citizenship base of ap-
proximately 240,000. ' 8 The decision provoked strong reaction from the
Cherokee leadership. Concerned that "three people" could "change[] the
last 30 years of Cherokee Nation governance," Principal Chief Chad
Smith called for a popular vote, where the issue of Cherokee citizenship
could be answered "once and for all."' 9 Marilyn Vann, President of the
Descendants of Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes, denounced such a
move as a transparent effort to deny Black Cherokees their rightful place
in the Cherokee polity. She asked, "Is the Cherokee Nation a 'race' or a
'nation'?".2
Chief Smith, in a lengthy statement, rejoined that the delegates vot-
ing to approve the 1975 Constitution intended to exclude the Freedmen's
descendants, and those delegates believed "that an Indian nation should be
composed of Indians.' 2' The Tribal Council agreed with Chief Smith that
the question was ripe for political decision by the voters, and on June 12,
2006, in a 13-2 vote, approved an amendment "which will exclude
16. Lucy Alen,JAT-04-09 at 22 ("11 C.N.C.A. § 12 adds a 'by blood' requirement
[for citizenship] that simply does not exist in Article III.").
17. Id. at 4.
18. Between March 7, 2006 (the day Lucy Allen was decided) and May 1, 2006, ap-
proximately 800 Freedmen's descendants became citizens of the Nation. S.E. Ruckman,
Freedmen's Status Remains in Limbo, TuLsA WORLD, May 1, 2006, at A17.
19. Citizen Views Fall on Both Sides of Freedmen Issue, Cherokee Nation News
Release, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=chief&ID=/
aoDJcgHYwk= [hereinafter Freedmen Statement]. ("By a 2 to 1 vote, three people essen-
tially changed the last 30 years of Cherokee Nation governance.... I believe the Cherokee
people should answer the question once and for all of who should be entitled to Cherokee
citizenship as well as the status of the Freedmen.")
Chief Smith was officially neutral on the merits: "I want to make sure that my posi-
tion on this is that I'm not advocating for or against the Freedmen. My position on this is
that it's such a monumental issue, the people should decide, and that's the whole purpose."
Travis Snell, Officials Call for Special Election at Jay Meeting, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, Aug. 2006,
available at http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=phoenix&ID=pAr3mH5//4k=.
However, he was widely perceived in the press as supporting the amendment. See, e.g.,
Cherokee Chief Wants Freedmen Out of Tribe, Mar. 15, 2006, http://www.indianz.com/
News/2006/012980.asp; Cherokee Chief Criticized for Stance on Freedmen, Apr. 6, 2006,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/013017.asp); Cherokee Leader Wants to Overturn
Freedmen Decision, 2006, http://www.kten.com/Global/story.asp?S=4633347.
20. Cherokee Chief Calls for an "Indian" Nation by Blood, Mar. 20, 2006, http://
indianz.com/News/2006/013060.asp.
21. Freedmen Statement, supra note 19.
[VOL. 12:387
A Race or a Nation?
Freedmen from the tribe's rolls" 22 In the same meeting, so eager for po-
litical action were some proponents of the amendment that the Council
narrowly turned back a motion that would have required a special elec-
tion by November 4, 2006, to settle the question; undeterred, supporters
of the special election began a petition drive to achieve their objective,
and on October 5, 2006, the Cherokee Nation's highest court ruled that
sufficient signatures had been obtained, and Chief Smith set March 3,
2007, as the date of the special election.23 Because Lucy Allen affirmed
Freedmen's descendants' citizenship, these African-descended Cherokees
22. Will Chavez, Council Amends Constitution to Exclude Freedmen, CHEROKEE PHOE-
NIX, July 2006, available at http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=phoenix&ID=
y9s9MNhgX48=. The Phoenix reported that "Councilors Bill Baker, Audra ConnerJackie
Bob Martin, David Thornton, Don Garvin, Linda O'Leary, Melvina Shotpouch, Johnny
Keener, Meredith Frailey, Cara Cowan-Watts, Bill Johnson, Buel Anglen and Chuck
Hoskin voted to amend the constitution. Councilors Joe Crittenden and Phyllis Yargee
voted against the measure." Id.
23. Id. ("The vote on the resolution calling for a special election was 8-7. At least
10 votes or two-thirds of the council was needed to call for a special election."). Freed-
men's descendants were relieved (prematurely, as it turned out) that a special election
would not be held: "Leslie Ross of Suisun City, Calif., a Cherokee citizen by blood and a
Freedmen, attended the council meeting to support other Freedmen and thought it was
'good we won't have a special election.' He said the councilors who want 'to kick us out'
should read the tribe's history. Part of that history, he said, includes his great-grandfather
Stick Ross who served on the Tribal Council." Id. On Freedmen's participation in Chero-
kee governance during the late nineteenth century, see infra note 110. The text of the
March 3, 2007, ballot measure provides:
"This measure amends the Cherokee Nation Constitution section which
deals with who can be a citizen of the Cherokee Nation.
A vote "yes" for this amendment would mean that citizenship would be lim-
ited to those who are original enrollees or descendants of Cherokees by
blood, Delawares by blood, or Shawnees by blood as listed on the Final Rolls
of the Cherokee Nation commonly referred to as the Dawes Commission
Rolls closed in 1906. This amendment would take away citizenship of cur-
rent citizens and deny citizenship to future applicants who are solely
descendants of those on either the Dawes Commission Intermarried Whites
or Freedmen Rolls.
A vote "no" would mean that Intermarried Whites and Freedmen original
enrollees and their descendants would continue to be eligible for citizenship.
Neither a "yes" nor a "no" vote will affect the citizenship rights of those in-
dividuals who are original enrollees or descendants of Cherokees by blood,
Delawares by blood, or Shawnees by blood as listed on the Final Rolls of the
Dawes Commission Rolls closed in 1906.
SHALL THE MEASURE BE APPROVED?
FOR THE MEASURE-YES
AGAINST THE MEASURE-NO"
See supra note 4.
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had the opportunity to vote on the amendment; many who were eligible
but not yet members registered for tribal citizenship.24
When the votes were counted, however, supporters of citizenship
for Freedmen's descendants had lost: by a vote of 6,693 (77%) for the
measure to 2,040 (23%) against, the amendment was approved . Chief
Smith hailed the election as a victory for tribal sovereignty, stating, "The
Cherokee people exercised the most basic democratic right, the right to
vote. ... Their voice is clear as to who should be citizens of the Chero-
kee Nation. No one else has the right to make that determination. It was
a right of self-government, affirmed in 23 treaties with Great Britain and
the United States and paid dearly with 4,000 lives on the Trail of
Tears. 26 Marilyn Vann reacted differently: calling the election "fraudu-
lent," she claimed Chief Smith "manufactured" the outcome, and
promised a challenge.27 Vann expressed disappointment that voters could
not see past "the rhetoric and fear-mongering," adding that, "The major-
ity [of the Cherokee people] know very little about the tribe's history,
they look to their leaders for information.... With sufficient time we
could have educated the people to what the election really was about.
'2 8
Despite the success at the polls enjoyed by the amendment's propo-
nents, the history of the Freedmen's relationship with the Cherokee
Nation does not suggest that the question of Cherokee political and social
identity will be answered by a single election.
II.THE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY AS A CRISIS OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDENTITY
A. A Race or a Nation? Identity by Blood or Base Roll
Freedmen descendant Marilyn Vann's succinct statement of the
problem, "Is the Cherokee Nation a 'race' or a 'nation'? " '2 9 offers a choice
between a conception of the tribe as a genealogical club whose members
share a common lineage, and a notion of the tribe as a political sovereign
whose citizenship criteria do not discriminate on the basis of race. In
support of the latter alternative, Vann observes that "[t]he federal govern-
24. See supra note 18.
25. Cherokee Nation Special Election Results, supra note 5.
26. Id.
27. Sheila K. Stogsdill, Cherokee Nation Votes to Remove Descendants of Freed-
men, THE OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 3, 2007, available at http://www.newsok.com/article/
3021663.
28. Id.
29. See supra note 20.
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ment does not have government to government relationships with 'races'
but with nations.
30
Vann's otherwise valid point obscures the fact that such govern-
ment-to-government relationships are, as to tribal governments, with
Indian nations, thus begging the question, when, if ever, Cherokee Nation
citizenship can be divorced from the Native American genealogy of
Cherokee Nation members. As Chief Smith observed, some Cherokees
believe "an Indian nation should be composed of Indians." 31 Put in such
stark terms, the choice for Cherokee Nation voters in 2007 came down
to selecting a political identity based on biology or law-opting for tribal
citizenship by a show of "Indian blood" or by the appearance of an ances-
tor of any race simply because they appear on one of the Dawes Rolls.
The latter point deserves elaboration. As employed in the rhetoric of
Cherokee citizenship, "Indian blood" is a larger racial category than
"Cherokee blood" and includes Dawes-enrolled Shawnees and Delawares
and their descendants, who became Cherokee citizens as a result of trea-
ties between the Nation and the United States after the Civil War.32
Significantly, the listings of Shawnees and Delawares on the Dawes Rolls
indicate only degrees of Shawnee or Delaware "blood," not degrees of
Cherokee "blood" if any, so Shawnees and Delawares remain Cherokee
citizens by adoption, like the Freedmen and intermarried Whites, not citi-
zens "by blood." Yet, as Shawnees and Delawares, they are indigenous
people and therefore potentially members by "Indian blood." "Cherokees
by blood" are denominated as such on the "Cherokee by blood" and
"Minor Cherokees by blood" rolls. Further, although many of the Freed-
men or their descendants at the time of enrollment may in fact have had
Native American ancestry, such lineage was not recognized by the agents
of the Dawes Commission, who consistently enrolled these "[B] lack Indi-
ans" under the Freedmen Roll.3
Thus, amending the Constitution, as voters did, effectively elimi-
nated only descendants of the Freedmen and intermarried Whites, while
constructing a citizenship composed exclusively of "Indians by blood."
While "Indian blood" as established by the Dawes Rolls will now be suf-
ficient for tribal citizenship, "Cherokee blood" is now, and will continue
to be, a prerequisite for holding elective office in the Nation.34 As a result
30. Id.
31. Freedmen Statement, supra note 19.
32. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 217-225 and accompanying text.
34. Lucy Allen, JAT-04-09 at 9 ("The only time a legal right, under Cherokee law,
depends on Cherokee blood, is when a person decides to run for elected office. In that
instance, we rely on the blood degree findings of the Dawes Commission to make sure
our Principal Chief and Council members are Cherokee citizens by blood. That guaran-
tees Cherokee control of government, but that government is ultimately elected by a
larger and more diverse constituency of citizens.").
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of the restructuring, then, out of the Dawes Rolls' mixed taxonomy of
race and law-"native Cherokees" and "adopted" citizens of various
"bloods" and marital statuses-emerges a new race-based hierarchy of the
Cherokee polity, with "Indians by blood" as its citizenry and "Cherokees
by blood" as its leadership.
3
The vote to impose a "blood" requirement for citizenship, with the
consequence that more than 2,000 Freedmen's descendants who are citi-
zens of the Nation will be expelled, and thousands more precluded from
citizenship, signals that the Cherokee Nation may be entering-not exit-
ing--a crisis of political identity. The risks to tribal sovereignty are real: by
acting to expel "its Freedmen" 36 the Nation and its leadership will likely
suffer severe reputational damages as a politically regressive and even racist
enclave. Early in the controversy Oklahoma State Senator Judy Eason
McIntyre and Representative Jabar Shumate wrote an "open letter" to
Chief Smith, alleging that his support of a blood quantum requirement
and expulsion of the Freedmen's descendants would create a "racist-
based" citizenship system.37 The Cherokee lay advocate who represented
Lucy Allen before the JAT, David Cornsilk, has said of Smith, simply, "he's
a racist.
3 s
The perception that race is driving the issue of citizenship could
only have been enhanced by statements like those of former Cherokee
Nation Deputy Chief, John Ketcher, who toured local Oklahoma com-
munities in the summer of 2006 to collect signatures on the petition that
yielded the special election. In community meetings with tribal members,
Ketcher said:
35. Cognizant of the terms of the amendment and its impact on Cherokee citizen-
ship, throughout this Article the phrase "Indians by blood rolls" or "blood rolls" refers to
those Dawes Rolls which list Cherokees by blood (adults and minors), Shawnees, and
Delawares.
36. The designation of"Freedmen" has been challenged by legal scholar Natsu Saito
who argues that the term, as applied to the Seminoles of African descent, "implies that
they were enslaved until freedom was bestowed upon them by an outsider or governmen-
tal source." Natsu Taylor Saito, From Slavery and Seminoles to AIDS in South Africa:An Essay
on Race and Property in International Law, 45 VILL. L. REv. 1135, 1173 (2000).
37. Cherokee Leader Disputes Racially-tinged Allegations from Black Lawmakers, NATivE
AMERICAN TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at 1; Cherokee Chief Criticized for Stance on Freedmen, supra
note 19.
38. Donna Hales, Chief Not Ready to End Fight to Keep Out Freedmen, MUSKOGEE
PHOENIX, Mar. 16, 2006, http://www.aaanativearts.com/articlel323.html. In rejecting
such an accusation, Principal Chief Smith said, "[It] is clear is that the Cherokee Nation
Constitution is not based on race. People of many different ethnic backgrounds, African
Americans, [W]hite Americans and Hispanic Americans, have Cherokee ancestors on the
Dawes Roll; and they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee Nation citizenship. How-
ever, someone will undoubtedly play the race card in this debate. The issue at hand is what
classes of people should be citizens of the Cherokee Nation and who should make that
decision, the courts or the Cherokee people themselves." Freedmen Statement, supra note 19.
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SPRING 2007] A Race or a Nation? 397
[W]e've always been people with Native American blood.
People now want to come in because in the past some Chero-
kees held slaves. After the Civil War, as part of a treaty, we were
forced to accept the Freedmen. It was done by the government
to punish us. We are trying to rectify this and allow Cherokee
people to vote on Cherokee membership.
39
Ketcher would accept admitting Freedmen's descendants who could
establish their "Indian blood." As reported in the CHEROKEE PHOENIX, the
Nation's paper of record, Ketcher "believes most Cherokee citizens have
no problem with [B]lack citizens who have Cherokee blood or have
blood from another tribe," stating, "I think the majority of the Cherokees
would probably vote to have those Freedman who are part Cherokee to
be citizens and rightfully so."40 To Freedmen's descendants like Marilyn
Vann, Ketcher's reliance on "Indian blood" as the sine qua non of citizen-
ship surely sounded like reliance on a racial criterion aimed at eliminating
African-descended citizens from the Nation.4' Immediately following the
election, Ketcher cited the historic significance of the result, stating, "I
think it will be very important ... for our children and grandchildren....
Hopefully they won't have to face this problem again. Those with Chero-
kee blood are still welcome in our Cherokee Nation," adding, "I'm going
to sleep good.,
42
Ketcher's sleep may seem surprisingly untroubled in light of the re-
cent example of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma: in 2000 the
Seminoles attempted to amend their constitution to impose a blood
quantum requirement that would have excluded Freedmen's descendants
from tribal citizenship. They did not submit the amendments to the BIA
39. Will Chavez, Freedmen Debate Spreads to Communities, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, Aug. 2006,
available at http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=phoenix&ID=Auv59ngcDXQ=.
40. Id.
41. Vann countered by holding her own community meetings.Vann stated that
[T]he Freedmen want to retain citizenship rights they have had for more
than 140 years, and many of them have Indian blood with the documents to
prove it. "Freedmen for the most part are Cherokee people who had rights
before by treaty and under the 1975 and 1999 constitutions," [Vann] said.
Vann claims the Cherokee Nation has citizens on its rolls including Dela-
wares, Shawnees and [W]hites, but the council has not denied their rights to
Cherokee citizenship. "The Nation was built by not just Cherokees, but by
Freedmen, Delawares and Shawnees," she said. "Now the council is saying,
"'we don't need them anymore.'"
Id. In fact, Keeler's allowance for descendants of Dawes enrollees who have "blood from
another tribe" would permit citizenship for adopted Shawnees and Delawares: it is a crite-
rion based on "Indian blood" which would only exclude descendants of Freemen and
intermarried Whites who lacked demonstrable indigenous ancestry. See supra notes 32-35
and accompanying text.
42. Cherokee Nation Votes to Remove Descendants of Freedmen, supra note 27.
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for approval, as required by their constitution.43 In 2001 the Seminoles
relied on the unapproved amendments to conduct tribal elections for
chief and council, thus disenfranchising Freedmen's descendants. The BIA
refused to recognize the Nation's newly-elected leadership, and after a suit
brought by the tribe, a federal district court agreed with the BIA.44 The
crisis was resolved only after the Seminoles dropped the blood quantum
requirement and the affected Freedmen's bands held new elections." Al-
though the legal posture of the two tribes differs greatly (the 1999
Cherokee Constitution does not require federal approval of its amend-
ments, the Seminole Constitution did; Cherokee Freedmen's descendants
were allowed to vote on their nation's citizenship amendment, Seminole
Freedmen's descendants' votes though cast were not counted), it is entirely
conceivable that a federal court would find grounds for intervention into
Cherokee governmental affairs, perhaps by an expansive reading of the
Indian Civil Rights Act.46 Even before the vote on the amendment, advo-
cates for Freedmen's descendants had gone to federal court seeking relief,
on the grounds that the election would violate the Cherokee Nation's
treaty obligations and impose a "badge of slavery" in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment. In declining to intervene, Judge Henry Kennedy,
of the District of Columbia Circuit, expressed respect for tribal sover-
eignty, but wondered why the Nation would proceed with an election
that would "invite this court, or some other court, to intervene" if the
outcome displaced Freedmen's descendants.47
43. The Seminole Nation unsuccessfully challenged the authority of the Depart-
ment of the Interior to review and approve the amendments to the Seminole
Constitution. See Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 206 ER.D. 1, 3-5 (D.D.C. 2001)
(holding DOI has authority, pursuant to Article XIII of the Seminole Constitution, to
approve amendments to the Seminole Constitution before they could be adopted).
44. Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 ESupp 2d 122, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2002)
(upholding action of Secretary of the Interior to refuse recognition of newly-elected tribal
government where votes of Freedmen's descendants were not counted, and otherwise
eligible citizens were prevented from running for office because of unlawful amendments
to Seminole constitution).
45. See Letter from Neal A. McCaleb, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, to Seminole
Chief Jerry G. Haney (Dec. 19, 2003) available at http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/
mccaleb121902.pdf.
46. See Angela Riley, Sovereignty and fliberalism, 95 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007)
(advocating against expansion of ICRA or similar laws that would impede tribal self-
governance); FELIX COHEN, CoHfEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INrDIA LAW § 4.01[2][b]
(LexisNexis 2005) (2005). ("[T]he Department of the Interior has taken the position that
it may decline to continue government-to-government relations with a tribe's elected
officials if it finds that the tribal membership laws underlying voter eligibility for the elec-
tion violate [ICRA] or the tribe's own constitution.").
47. Judge Won't Stop Cherokee Election on Freedmen, Feb. 22, 2007, http://
www.indianz.com/News/2007/001496.asp.
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The political crisis of the Cherokee Nation also signals a crisis of so-
cial identity: what makes one a Cherokee? Indeed, the latter question
underlies the political options of blood or base rolls, because how voters
in 2007 determined tribal citizenship criteria depended upon how they
variously recognized-and defined-their fellow Cherokees. In the fol-
lowing section I will look at how one primary means of definition,
namely, legal status has defined the Cherokee Freedmen and circum-
scribed their rights.48
B. Cherokee Identity: Legal Definitions and their Limits
Legal definitions play a prominent though not exclusive role in de-
ciding Indian status. The object of definition may be collective (What is a
tribe?) or individual (Who is an Indian?) and may be determined outside
a tribe (by a state or the federal government) or within a tribe (through
tribal citizenship criteria). 49 The history of the Cherokee Freedmen dem-
onstrates, however, that legal definitions of citizenship that appear race-
neutral (or more precisely, race-inclusive) have operated to enforce nor-
mative conceptions of the Cherokee Nation as a tribe properly by and for
only persons possessing "Indian blood"
1. Collective Definitions: The Cherokee Nation
The Cherokee Nation is one of three federally-recognized Chero-
kee governments, the others being the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
(composed of descendants of Cherokees who did not remove to Indian
Territory in the 1830s) and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians (situated in northeastern Oklahoma and Arkansas and consisting
of Cherokee cultural traditionalists).,s Not sited on a reservation, the
48. In her study of Native American identity formation, sociologist Eva Garroutte, a
citizen of the Cherokee Nation sets out four competing definitions through which indi-
viduals and communities negotiate Indian identity. Garroutte's definitions of legal,
biological, cultural, and self-identification identity formation are highly useful in under-
standing the forms of Native American self-identity. See EVA MARIE GRourrTE, REAL
INDIANS: IDENTITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE AMEmcA 14-98 (Univ. of Cal. Press
2003).
49. See id. at 14-37.
50. RUSSELL THORNTON, THE CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 138-43 (Univ. of
Neb. Press 1990). In the absence of direct congressional action, which is rare, collective
legal definitions of Indians today result from the Federal Acknowledgment Process (FAP).
The FAP requires a tribe to show its historical continuity, political and communal integ-
rity, and application of citizenship criteria that preclude members from belonging to other
tribes. See 25 C.FR. § 83.7 (2007). A federally-recognized tribe receives the privileges and
immunities incident to a government-to-government relationship with the United States.
See 25 C.ER. § 83.2 (2007).The Eastern Band has enjoyed federal recognition since 1889.
The United Keetoowah Band (UKB) organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of
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Cherokee Nation exercises sovereignty across its 14-county Tribal Juris-
dictional Service Area in northeastern Oklahoma. 1 Although jeopardized
by the anti-sovereignty Curtis Act in 1898,2 the Cherokee Nation refers
to the Five Civilized Tribes Act of 1906 and a key 1976 federal court de-
.* 53
cision to establish its legal continuity with the tribe that walked the Trail
of Tears in 1838-39. The Act of 1906 states that tribal governments "are
hereby continued in full force and effect for all purposes authorized by
law. ' 4 In the words of Chief Smith in 2006 during an occasion celebrat-
ing the 100th anniversary of the Act of 1906, "There is a great myth that
the [Five] tribes went away when Oklahoma became a state.... We have
to remind ourselves and our neighbors that the five tribes have continued
in full force and effect through this entire last century."5 Smith reinforced
the point following the Lucy Allen decision, when he stated:
[R]egardless of one's point of view, the Lucy Allen case rein-
forces the principle that the constitutional government of the
Cherokee Nation is the same constitutional government
formed in 1839. It properly destroys the falsehood that there is
a new Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma created in 1975 and an
older Cherokee Nation with a constitution dated 1839. There
is only one constitutional government of the Cherokee people
1934 and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 and received federal recognition in
1950. The UKB self-describes as the "First Federally Recognized Tribe in Oklahoma."
UNITED KEEoowAH BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA, CHEROKEE HISTORY AS
You'vE NEVER HEARD IT (Historic Preservation Program 2006), available at http://
www.unitedkeetoowahband.org/Documents/KeetoowahHistoryBooklet.pdf. The Chero-
kee Nation would "awaken" its tribal government in the 1970s. See infra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
51. Cherokee Nation, Demographics, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section
=demographics.
52. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
53. See 34 Stat. 137, 59th Cong. (1906); Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F Supp. 1110 (D.D.C.
1976). In a decision focused on the Creek Nation but applicable to all the Five Tribes, the
court ruled,
[D]espite the general intentions of the Congress of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries to ultimately terminate the tribal government of
the Creeks, and despite an elaborate statutory scheme implementing numer-
ous intermediate steps toward that end, the final dissolution of the Creek
tribal government created by the Creek Constitution of 1867 was never
statutorily accomplished, and indeed that government was instead explicitly
perpetuated.
Id. at 1118.
54. 34 Stat. 137, 59th Cong. (1906).
55. Will Chavez, 5 Tribes Meet to Commemorate Historical Act, CHEROKEE PHOENIX,
June 2006, available at http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=phoenix&ID=
RKvSjW7+iiQ=.
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since 1839 and that simply is Cherokee Nation. The claim of
Freedmen citizenship goes back to the 1866 amendment to
the 1839 Cherokee Nation Constitution. 6
A dramatic effect of the Curtis Act, however, was to deny the Na-
tion the right to exercise autonomously its inherent sovereignty. 7 After
the Curtis Act, the Cherokee Nation continued to exercise minimal gov-
ernmental functions, but especially after the creation of the State of
Oklahoma on November 16, 1907, the Nation and its leadership became
instruments of the federal government for many years-Cherokees fre-
quently speak of the period from the Curtis Act to 1970 as one when the
Nation was "sleeping." As Keetoowah Cherokee Robert Conley has writ-
ten of the period following the Curtis Act, "Although nothing in the law
prohibited Cherokees from electing their chief and council, a regime of
bureaucratic imperialism had begun. For all practical purposes, the
Cherokee nation had become dormant."' 8 Cherokee sovereignty finally
awakened in 1970, roused in large part by President Richard Nixon's wa-
tershed repudiation of the federal policy of tribal termination
("termination is morally and legally unacceptable") and endorsement of a
policy of tribal self-determination. 9 Congress, responding to President
Nixon, quickly passed legislation giving tribes back the authority to elect
60their own leaders.
Between 1970 and 1999, the Nation's population rose from 40,000
to over 200,000; while once concentrated almost exclusively in Okla-
homa, citizens today span the country with significant concentrations in
56. Freedmen Statement, supra note 19.
57. See Eric Lamont, Overcoming the Politics of Reform:The Story of the Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6 (2003-2004) ("From
1907 through 1970, the Cherokee Nation functioned without a government. During this
time, the U.S. Government appointed a Principal Chief, who did little more than approve
leases and sign documents transferring out the last of the allotments.").
58. ROBERT J. CONLEY, THE CHEROKEE NATION: A HISTORY 202 (Univ. of N.M.
2005). The United Keetoowah Band (UKB) and the Nation have often clashed over
Cherokee identity. See Keetoowah History, http://www.unitedkeetoowahband.org/
Documents/History/Essayl.htm ("[T]he Keetoowahs have always been known to be the
most traditional and conservative of the Cherokee, holding on to the old ways of the full-
blood Cherokee. Legends say that if these ways ever discontinue, the Cherokee will be no
more.").
59. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommenda-
tions for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970), in
DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A.WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 218-20, 219 (5th ed. 2005). The legal basis for the
resurgence of Cherokee tribal sovereignty had been laid years earlier, with the repeal of
the Curtis Act by the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, which permitted tribes, inter
alia, to adopt constitutions. 49 Stat. 1967, 74th Cong. (1936) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 501
et seq.).
60. Principal Chiefs Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-495, 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
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Arkansas, Texas and California.6' Since 1971, the Cherokee Nation has
emerged as a model of Indian economic and cultural self-determination.
By its own financial indicators, the Nation is enjoying strong growth in
revenues generated in part by Cherokee Nation Enterprises (CNE), a di-
versified business wholly-owned by the tribe.62 CNE paid dividends of
$15.0 million into the Nation's discretionary budget in 2005, up from
$1.9 million in 1998. CNE employed 2811 people in 2005, compared
with 511 in 1998. Cherokee Nation Industries (CNI), a second corpora-
tion wholly-owned by the Nation, was started 35 years ago and today
focuses on high-tech aerospace and military assembly. CNI's profits have
risen from $1.6 million in 2003 to $3.5 million in 2005.63
Between fiscal 2001 and 2004, the Nation opened two new com-
munity health clinics which contributed to an increase of 49,000 patient
visits, and made plans to open three more clinics in neighboring towns. As
federal funding for health care is decreasing, the Nation's contribution to
health services for tribal citizens is rising: from $49 million in fiscal year
2000, to $76 million in fiscal 2004. In the 1997-98 academic year, the
Nation supported 722 higher education scholarships for the Nation's citi-
zens; in 2004-05, the number had grown to 2147. Under Chief Smith's
leadership, the Nation has made a sustained and successful effort to revi-
talize Cherokee language study and renew traditional cultural activities
and awareness, especially among Cherokee youth. 4 Today the Nation is
widely recognized as a model of economic success and accounting integ-
rity as well as a leader in innovative and effective cultural programming.
61
Ironically, the revival of the Cherokee Nation was assisted by the
same constituency that is now facing expulsion. Conley writes that "[i]n
1971, the Cherokee Nation held its first election for Principal Chief since
before Oklahoma statehood in 1907 .... Voter eligibility was determined
61. Lamont, supra note 57, at 19.
62. Status Report 2005, Cherokee Nation Finances, available at http://
www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=SR&Name=SR2005&ID=BWTLdASilB4=.
63. CNI recently suffered losses of an estimated $6.3 million due to investments in
failed or failing energy ventures. The SEC is investigating allegations of fraud in connec-
tion with the stock purchases. Cherokee Nation Businesses Losing Millions, July 28, 2006,
http://indianz.com/News/2006/015 180.asp.
64. See Cherokee Speakers Sweep Youth Language Fair, Status Report 2005, http://
www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=SR&Name=SR2005&ID=8NFaWSFOPro=.
65. See Financial Excellence Award Received Again, Status Report 2005, http://
www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=SR&Name=SR2005&ID=GNI//ZiYz00= (the
Nation received twelve awards of the Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Finan-
cial Reporting by the Government Financial Officers Association and multiple awards by
the Honoring Nations Program of the Harvard Program for American Indian Economic
Development); HPAIED Honoring Nations Directory, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
hpaied/documents/HNDirectory-99-03.pdf.
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by the Dawes Rol[s]. ' 66 Among the citizens whose eligibility was deter-
mined by the Dawes Rolls and who cast votes in that first election were
descendants of the Nation's Freedmen.67
2. Individual Definitions: Citizenship in the Cherokee Nation
Individual legal definitions of Indians are determined by the tribes
themselves or, in some circumstances, by Congress. 68 The United States
Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez upheld the right of tribes
to determine their own criteria for citizenship consistent with retained
tribal sovereignty and Congress's intent to promote Indian self-
government. 69 Except where Congress has acted to abridge their author-
ity, tribes may determine their criteria for citizenship, even where, as in
Martinez, the result disadvantages a class that would be protected under
the federal Constitution's equal protection guarantee, were it applicable. 0
Martinez implicitly authorizes a host of different tribal citizenship-criteria:
"blood quantum" is a common though not universal criterion; others
include maternal or paternal descent, residency on the reservation, com-
munity participation, vote of the tribal council, community recognition
or parental enrollment, performance of certain annual duties to the tribe,
appearance of ancestors on specified base rolls, and marriage to or adop-
tion by a tribal member.
7 1
Once recognized as a citizen, individuals may receive numerous and
varied rights, depending upon the tribe. They may include voting rights,
the right to run for and hold tribal office, preferential hiring by the tribe,
66. CONLEY, supra note 58, at 217.
67. CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE
NATION or. OKLAHOMA 178 (2002). The re-enfranchisement of the Freedmen's descendants
in 1971 was to be short-lived. In the 1983 tribal election, Black Cherokees like the Rever-
end Roger H. Nero who appeared at the polls were shocked to be informed that they
could not vote: the tribe had determined that voter eligibility would be limited to Dawes
Rolls descendants who possessed Indian blood. Id., see infra notes 101-103 and accompa-
nying text.
68. Garroutte observes that "[a] 1978 congressional survey discovered no less than
thirty-three separate definitions of Indians in use in different pieces of federal legislation.
These may or may not correspond with those any given tribe uses to determine its citi-
zenship." GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 16 (emphasis in original).
69. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,72 (1978).
70. Id. at 55. In Martinez, the disadvantaged class was women. The federal Constitu-
tion does not apply to federally-recognized Indian tribes except to the extent required by
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Significantly, Martinez held that federal courts' power
to review claims arising under ICRA was limited to the right of habeus corpus. Id. at 67.
71. GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 15. See Christine Metteer, The Trust Doctrine, Sover-
eignty, and Membership: Determining 1ho Is Indian, 5 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 53, 86 (2003)
(arguing "tribes must be allowed to retain their various membership criteria because these
criteria for determining who is and who is not a member are a statement of what makes
the tribe unique.").
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access to tribal courts and subjection to tribal law, the right to receive
tribal social services, the right to receive revenues generated by tribally-
owned businesses, or the right to share in distributions derived from the
exploitation of natural resources on or beneath tribal lands.72
Because establishing tribal citizenship criteria is a function of a
tribe's political process, it is subject to all the vagaries of lawmaking and
those who miss the opportunity, for example, to sign up when tribal base
rolls are established are denied, and their descendants are denied, the
chance for political participation "from the inside" unless the tribe makes
an accommodation for them. As Garroutte observes, such persons, though
perhaps culturally or biologically Native American, and desirous of an
"official" Indian identity, are legally "not 'real Indians.' They are 'outa-
luck.' ,73
The former slaves of Cherokees were legally defined as tribal citi-
zens when the Cherokee Nation signed a Reconstruction treaty with the
United States on July 19, 1886. By its terms, the Treaty of 1866 provided
in relevant part that:
[A]ll freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of
their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored per-
sons who were in the country at the commencement of the
rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return
within six months, and their descendants shall have the rights
of native Cherokees. 4
In consequence of the Treaty, the Cherokee Nation promptly
amended its Constitution:
[A]ll native-born Cherokees, all Indians, and [W]hites legally
members of the Nation by adoption, and all freedmen who
have been liberated by voluntary act of their former owners or
by law, as well as free colored persons who were in the country
at the commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents
therein, or who may return within six months from the 19th
day of July, 1866, and their descendants who reside within the
72. See GARRouTTE, supra note 48, at 15-18 (various rights incident to tribal citizen-
ship).
73. Id. at 22. The term "outalucks," coined by historian Kent Carter, refers to "peo-
ple of Indian ancestry who are nevertheless unable to negotiate their identity as Indians
within the available legal definitions." Id. at 14 (citing Kent Carter, Wantabees and Outa-
lucks, 66 CHRON. OF OKLA. 94,94-101 (1988)).
74. Charles J. Kappler, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAws AND TREATIES 944 (1975-76 prtg.).
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limits of the Cherokee Nation, shall be taken, and deemed to
be, citizens of the Cherokee Nation. s
Rather than settle the issue of the Freedmen's legal status, however,
the Treaty of 1866 and constitutional amendments of 1866 "set in motion
what proved to be a torturous effort to determine precisely who qualified
for the tribal rolls." 76 The confluence of the Treaty's and Constitution's six-
month deadline for establishing residency, the dispersion of former slaves
throughout the region due to war, and limited means of communicating
vital information meant that many former slaves did not return in time to
receive tribal citizenship-they were "outaluck"-and entered Cherokee
history as the "too-lates":
[T]he treaty specified that former slaves desiring Cherokee
citizenship should present themselves by January 1867. During
the war, however, many Cherokee slaves had fled the territory
or had been taken out by their owners, and some freed people
77
who otherwise qualified did not make it back in time.
The challenge facing the Freedmen of establishing Cherokee social
identities under the circumstances of Reconstruction were exacerbated by
the early and sustained opposition of the Cherokee leadership to their
legal identity as citizens.8 As anthropologist Circe Sturm observed in
2002, "Despite the promises of this treaty [of 1866], the freedmen were
never fully accepted as citizens of the Cherokee Nation, and Cherokees to
75. CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 5 (amended 1866).
76. ANDREW DENSON, DEMANDING THE CHEROKEE NATION: INDIAN AUTONOMY AND
AMERICAN CULTURE 1830-1900 84 (2004).
77. Id. Denson adds that "[o]thers had trouble proving that they had been Cherokee
slaves, while some of those claiming citizenship had never been owned by Cherokees but
had migrated to the Indian Territory after the war in hopes of securing land." Id. The
confluence of slavery, war, and treaty law hit families especially hard. To reach the territory
in time, some parents left behind spouses and children, and if the families were reunited
after the six-month window had closed, federal agents could treat the late arrivals as terri-
torial intruders and expel them. Children who had been separated from their families
during slavery and sold often could not be reunited in time. Some minors had been bound
to service until their majority; they too could not return in time to establish their citizen-
ship. See MORRIS L.WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1838-1907
226 (1977) (citing Report of Captain John Craig, Federal Agent for the Cherokees, 1870,
that "not a few [former slaves] were detained in slavery in Texas for one or two years after
the war, or until they escaped...."). The harsh effects of the original deadline were par-
tially mitigated in 1870 by amendments permitting slaves who had resided "in the Nation
in 1861 [to] receive an allotment and citizenship whenever they returned to Indian Terri-
tory." THEDA PERDUE, SLAVERY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CHEROKEE SOCIETY, 1540-1866 143
(1979).
78. See KATJA MAY, AFRICAN AMERICANs AND NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE CREEK AND
CHEROKEE NATIONS, 1830S TO 1920s 71 (1996) ("From 1866 to 1876 freedmen could vote
and serve on juries.... After 1877 [and the election of traditionalist Principal Chief
Oochalata], the exercise of citizenship rights became difficult.").
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this day remain divided over the political status of their former slaves.
7 9
The matter of"[B]lack access to tribal resources" quickly became a focal
point of Cherokee resistance to Freedmen's citizenship. ° Sturm notes that
"[i]n an attempt to solidify their own economic and political interests, in
1883 the Cherokee tribal council passed legislation that excluded the
freedmen and other tribal citizens without Cherokee blood, such as the
Shawnees, Delawares, and intermarried [W]hites, from sharing in tribal
assets," such as those realized from the sale of tribal lands.8' Cherokee poli-
ticians argued that the Freedmen and their descendants had only the right
of occupancy, not ownership of tribal lands, and therefore were not enti-
tled to share in the distribution of any sale proceeds absent the Council's
82permission.
Congress responded, and passed legislation in 1888 that "required
the tribe to share its assets equally with the freedmen and other adopted
citizens. 8 3 To foster compliance with the law and rationalize the distribu-
tion of tribal assets, Congress called for an enrollment of all eligible
Freedmen by a federal agent. In 1889, the agent produced the Wallace
Roll, a record of 3,524 Freedmen or their descendants.
The Nation continued to resist the legal definition of Freedmen as
Cherokee Nation citizens, prompting Congress in 1890 to authorize ad-
judication of the Nation's obligations to the Freedmen in the Court of
Claims. In 1895 the Court of Claims ruled in favor of the Freedmen,
holding that the grant of rights to Freedmen and their descendants by the
Cherokee Nation under its Constitution (amended 1866), consistent with
the Nation's obligations under the Treaty of 1866, precluded the Nation
from denying the Freedmen an equal share in the distribution of proceeds
from the sale of communally-owned land:
84
79. STURM, supra note 67, at 171. The political history of Freedmen's citizenship after
the Civil War, which I summarize in this section, unless otherwise indicated, is found in id.
at 170-78.
80. DENSON, supra note 76, at 85 ("Economic factors tended to drive the freedmen
controversy").
81. STURM, supra note 67, at 171.
82. MAY, supra note 78, at 71. The irony of this position, of course, consists in its
application of the same principles of Euroamerican property law used by the Marshall
Court when it held tribes did not hold absolute title to aboriginal lands, only a right of
occupancy. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591 (1823) (Indians "are to be considered
merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their
lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others"). On Johnson
as a foundational case for United States legal colonization of Native Americans, see ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERiCA 51-58 (2005).
83. STURM, supra note 67, at 171 (citing 25 Stat. 608-609, 50th Cong. (1888)).
84. Whitmire v. Cherokee Nation, 30 Ct. Cl. 138, 156 (1895) ("If the common
property was to be retained for the general welfare [of the Cherokee Nation), he [the
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When the Cherokee people wrote into their constitution in
1866 "all native-born Cherokees, all Indians and [W]hites le-
gally members of the nation by adoption, and all freedmen,"
"shall be taken and be deemed to be citizens of the Cherokee
Nation," they fixed the status of the freedman and raised him
to the same rank of citizenship which they themselves enjoyed.
Thenceforth he was to be equal with themselves under the
constitution, governed by the same laws, enjoying the same
rights, possessed of the same immunities, and entitled to the
• 85
same protection.
The Court of Claims awarded the Freedmen $903,365 as their share
of $7,240,000 that had been realized from tribal land sales. However, be-
cause the Nation had already distributed the entire amount to Cherokees
"by blood," and the United States was named as co-defendant, it fell to
the federal government to pay the Freedmen. Not satisfied with the accu-
racy of the Wallace Roll, the government authorized a second recording,
called the Kern-Clifton Roll, which was finished in 1896 and listed 5,600
Freedmen or their descendants. Based on the Kern-Clifton Roll, the fed-
eral government satisfied the Whitmirejudgment and awarded the legally-
defined Cherokee Freedmen shares of profits from the sale of their tribal
lands.
The Freedmen's rights to Cherokee Nation citizenship were defined
once more when the federal government forced a new accounting on the
Five Tribes in 1893, in furtherance of the General Allotment Act of 1887
(popularly known as the Dawes Act). The policy of the federal govern-
ment in the nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries to assimilate Native
Americans into the culture and ethos of non-Indian society included, at
its heart, the inculcation of a love of private property, the sine qua non of
"civilized" peoples. The Dawes Act called for the break-up of tribally-
owned land into individual allotments and their award in severalty to in-
dividual Indians and other qualified tribal members, including the
Freedmen and their descendants. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901
called the Dawes Act "a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
mass, 8 6 seeing in its effects the end of tribal communities themselves and
the assimilation of their members into mainstream, farming America, thus
freeing the federal government of the anachronism of sovereign Indian
Freedman] was to share equally in its benefits; if it was to be sold and its proceeds divided,
the constitution [of the Cherokee Nation] made it as much his as theirs.").
85. Id. at 155. Counsel for the Cherokee Nation distinguished between the Freed-
men's "rights in the soil" (and proceeds of its sale), which they vigorously resisted
conceding, and Freedmen's "right to vote, to sit on juries, to sue and be sued, to receive
the benefits of public schools and charities," which they readily acknowledged "has never
been questioned or abridged in the slightest." Id. at 148.
86. Theodore Roosevelt, The Struggle for Self-Determination (1901), reprinted at http://
www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/native-voices/voices-display.cfi?id=92.
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nations and ending the federal trust responsibility to their members. The
87Dawes Act, and its politically potent successor the Curtis Act, represent
the legal embodiment of the philosophical aspiration expressed in 1892
by the founder of the Carlisle Indian School, Colonel Richard Pratt, who
stated that "all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the In-
dian in him, and save the man.
8 8
Significantly, the Dawes Act introduced the use of "blood quan-
tum"--degrees of "Indian blood"-as a metric for alienability of
allotments. On the theory that "full-blooded" Indians were less familiar
with property ownership and therefore less competent to manage their
affairs, Congress required that the land of any allottee of one-half degree
"Indian blood" or more would be held in trust for a determined number
of years, could not be sold, and would not be taxed; allotments to those
with less than one-half-degree "Indian blood" (including intermarried
Whites and Freedmen and their descendants) were subject to taxation but
89their owners could freely alienate their property.
In 1893 Congress created the Dawes Commission and charged it
with negotiating with the Five Tribes for the end of communal land
ownership. New rolls were needed to determine who should receive al-
lotments of land. Sturm states that after initial resistance to allotment, the
governments of the Five Tribes gave in and the Commission's agents "be-
gan taking oral and written testimony from applicants for tribal
enrollment":
[T]he final rolls of the Five Tribes were to list newborns, mi-
nors, and adults in three racial categories-freedmen,
intermarried [W]hites, and Indians by blood, with only the lat-
ter specifying an Indian blood quantum. Sensing an
87. See discussion supra at notes 57-58 and accompanying text. The Curtis Act of
1898 accelerated the federal government's attack on tribal sovereignty. As legal scholar
David E.Wilkins states:
[W]ith this act, Congress unilaterally and in direct violation of treaty and
statutory law, terminated the legal existence of the Five Civilized Tribes.This
detailed measure provided for the establishment and regulation of townsites;
for the management of leases of Indian mineral rights; authorized the Dawes
Commission to create enrollment lists which would serve as the basis for de-
ciding who received land allotments; prohibited the expansion of lands; and
also abolished the court systems of the tribal governments in Indian terri-
tory.... [The Five Tribes were reduced] to a poverty status that would take
decades for them to rise above.
DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME CoURT: THE
MASKING OF JUSTICE 66-67 (1997).
88. Richard C. Pratt, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4929/ (last visited Aug. 16,
2006).
89. SruRm, supra note 67, at 79.
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opportunity to reverse the inroads the freedmen were making
in the courts, the Cherokee Nation attempted to frustrate the
enrollment of the freedmen, who may have been citizens by
law but were not accepted in the minds of the majority....'0
A set number of acres per allottee, multiplied by the number of eli-
gible allottees as determined by the Dawes Rolls, subtracted from the
tribe's land base, invariably yielded unallotted acres of tribal land. Under
the Dawes Act, however, this "excess land" was not held in trust for the
tribes; instead, it was opened to non-Indian settlement. 9'
When the Dawes Commission completed its work in 1907, and
prepared to parcel out allotments of land to Indians "by blood," intermar-
ried Whites, and Freedmen or their descendants, the final rolls of the
Cherokee Nation as approved by the Secretary of the Interior "contained
the names of 41,798 citizens of whom 8,698 were [Cherokee] full-bloods.
There were 31,400 Cherokees by blood, 197 registered Delaware-
Cherokees, 286 intermarried [W]hites, 4,991 Cherokee minors, 4,305
freedmen, and 619 Cherokee freedmen minors." 
92
Because the Cherokee Nation today requires that prospective tribal
citizens establish an ancestor on a subset of the Dawes Rolls, the Dawes
Rolls have exclusive authority over the legal definition of who is a
Cherokee.93 Throughout the twentieth century persons claiming to be
90. Id. at 173.
91. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN:THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES 23 (1940).
92. WARDELL, supra note 77, at 333.
93. The Cherokee Nation's citizenship eligibility process provides:
[T]o be eligible for CDIB/Tribal Citizenship with the Cherokee Nation,
you must be able to provide documents that connect you to an enrolled lin-
eal ancestor, who is listed on the (DAWES ROLL) FINAL ROLLS OF
CITIZENS AND FREEDMEN OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES,
Cherokee Nation. This roll was taken between 1899-1906 of Citizens and
Freedmen residing in Indian Territory (now NE Oklahoma). Many appli-
cants do not qualify for CDIB/Citizenship as their ancestors did not meet
the enrollment requirements and were not enrolled. Certain requirements
had to be met in order to be placed on the Dawes Roll.
Cherokee Nation, Registration Instructions Page, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?
section=services&service=Registration&ID=8sRG9ZCF7PE= (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
"CDIB" refers to a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood, issued by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to establish the holder's Indian blood quantum based on information in the Dawes
Rolls. The effect of requiring a CDIB in addition to showing an ancestor on the Dawes
Rolls was to preclude non-Indians from registering as tribal members. See discussion infra
notes 101-103 and accompanying text. After the Lucy Allen decision, the Nation created a
separate registration procedure that did not require Freedmen's descendants to produce a
CDIB but still required them to demonstrate their descent from an enrollee on the Freed-
men's Roll of the Dawes Rolls. See Dawes Freedmen Roll Application (2006), http://
www.cherokee.org/docs/registration/Freedman-Registration.pdf.
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descendants of former Cherokee slaves whose ancestors appear on the
Kern-Clifton Roll or the Wallace Roll but not on the Dawes Rolls have
fought in court to overturn this exclusive authority and be recognized as
tribal citizens according to some other legal rubric. Their efforts have
been consistently unsuccessful.94
During the early years of the "dormition" of the Cherokee Nation,9
the Freedmen and their descendants, along with Cherokee Indians by
"blood" and the rest of the Five Tribes, suffered the depredations of un-
scrupulous land-grabbers who defrauded the new allottees at every
opportunity. So successful were these "grafters" that "by 1930 the Five-
Tribes Indians owned less than 2 million acres of land, down from a total
of 19,525,966 acres in 1890."96 In addition, Oklahoma during the early
decades of the twentieth century was marked by collective violence
against African Americans. Race riots occurred in several locations,9' in-
cluding the infamous Tulsa Riot of 1921, which took the lives of between
100 and 300 Black residents and charred an estimated 1256 homes and
virtually all schools, churches, businesses, a library and a hospital in Tulsa's
Black neighborhood of Greenwood. Between 1907 and 1920, 33 Black
persons were lynched in Oklahoma. During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan
in Oklahoma boasted tens of thousands of members.98 Notwithstanding
these horrific circumstances, the Freedmen and their descendants who
were included on the Dawes Rolls prospered as citizens of the Cherokee
Nation.99 According to Sturm:
94. See Cherokee Nation and United States v. Whitmire, 223 U.S. 108, 117 (1912)
(upholding the legitimacy of the Dawes Rolls over the Kern-Clifton Roll "as an authentic
identification of the individual freedmen"). See also STORM, supra note 67, at 173-78 (pro-
viding an overview of the legal history of the Freedmen's descendants in the twentieth
century).
95. See supra notes 57-60, 87 and accompanying text (discussing the Curtis Act of
1898, and President Nixon's renunciation of termination in 1970).
96. STURM, supra note 67, at 174 (citations omitted). See DEBO, supra note 91, at 92-
125 (describing the massive defrauding of the Dawes allotment recipients).
97. STURM, supra note 67, at 174.
98. DANNEY GOBLE, FINAL REPORT OF THE OKLAHOMA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (2001), http://www.tulsareparations.org/FinalReport.htm. See
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 41-63 (1997) (describing the history of
lynching as a failure to secure equal protection under the law for African Americans, and
racially motivated violence underJim Crow).
99. Phyllis E. Bernard, Oklahoma: The New Africa, 26 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 901,903
(2001) ("The widespread independent and self-governing Black settlements of Oklahoma
created a confident individualism that fell outside the mean of racial stereotyping."). See
also Peter Wallenstein, Native Americans Are White, African Americans Are Not: Racial Identity,
Marriage, Inheritance, and the Law in Oklahoma, 1907-1967, 39 JOURNAL OF THE WEST 55, 56
(2000) ("Oklahoma law defined as non[W]hite only residents who had African ances-
try.... [W]hile [Wlhites came to dominate, Indians moved into middle position.").
Oklahoma laws prohibited interracial marriage between Blacks and Whites until they were
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[D]espite increased violence during the first three decades of
the twentieth century, new freedmen citizens on the whole
fared better than they had in the antebellum Cherokee Nation.
Ever since allotment, they had increased civil rights and were
able to get access to the Cherokee courts, sit on juries, serve as
elected officials, have some security in their improvements, and
enjoy limited school facilities. 1°°
The Cherokee Freedmen's participation in the tribal elections in
1971-the first tribal election for the office of principal chief since before
the Curtis Act-and the subsequent tribal elections of 1975 may be a
high-water mark in the Freedmen's civic participation in the life of the
Nation. For by the time of the election of 1983, the Nation's leadership
had amended the tribal code to require voters to hold a Certificate of
Degree of Indian Blood, or "CDIB," issued by the federal government. In
an unpublished interview, former Principal Chief Ross Swimmer (Who
served from 1975 to 1985) stated, according to Sturm, that:
[F]ive years earlier in 1977-78 both the voter registration
committee and the tribal membership committee registration
committee had established new rules. These rules declared that
according to the new Cherokee Constitution of 1976, an
individual must have a certificate degree of Indian blood
(CDIB) to be registered as a tribal citizen or voter.101
The introduction of this requirement-possession of a federally-
issued CDIB-into the formal criteria for Cherokee Nation citizenship
in 1977-78 marked the first time since the Treaty of 1866 that the Nation
struck down consistent with Loving in 1967. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.").
100. STURM, supra note 67, at 174.
101. Id. at 178. Because elections are held every four years, the change in voter eligi-
bility in 1977-78 means the Freedmen's descendants would only have been permitted to
vote in the 1971 and 1975 elections. In part because the Freedmen were not permitted to
vote in the 2003 referendum on the 1999 Constitution, the BIA refused to approve the
document. However, the 1999 Constitution removed the textual provision of the 1975
Constitution calling for federal approval of constitutional changes, and on June 7, 2006,
the JAT ruled in a 2-1 decision (Leeds, J., dissenting) that due to the Nation's inherent
sovereignty the new Constitution received all necessary approvals when it was passed by
the voters. See Travis Snell, JAT Rules 2003 Constitution Law, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, July
2006; Comparison of the 1976 and 1999 Constitutions, http://www.cherokee.org/
TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc 1999Changes.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
The exclusion of the Freedmen from the 2003 referendum sparked a lawsuit by
Freedmen's descendants, including Marilyn Vann, against the United States (the Cherokee
Nation intervened) which remains pending. Complaint,Vann v. Norton, No. 1:03cv01711
(HHK) (D.D.C. 2003), available at http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/Plaintiffs
ResponsetoMotiontolntervenel I .doc.pdf.
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had officially predicated citizenship on biology: proof of "Indian blood"
was now required for tribal citizenship.1 0 2 The Dawes Rolls were effec-
tively attenuated to "Indian blood"-based categories only, and in
subsequent elections, Freedmen's descendants were turned back from the
polls. 1
03
3. The Limits of Legal Definitions of Citizenship
The history of the Cherokee Freedmen presented above only begins
to touch on the complex relationship between the Cherokee Nation in
Reconstruction and a victorious United States. It does not do justice to
the Nation's fight against the insatiable demands ofWhite settlers for "un-
occupied" Cherokee land in Indian Territory, the consequent loss of much
of the tribal land base through allotment and fraud, and the harsh impact
of decades-long government policies, both federal and state, aimed at cul-
tural assimilation and elimination of tribal sovereignty. The revival of the
Cherokee Nation in the early 1970s should be understood as the political
reawakening of a proud indigenous community. As former Principal Chief
Wilma Mankiller (1985-95) has said of this period, "The tribal power
base was dominated by men, but it was refreshing to see that at least a re-
birth of our government, which the federal government had tried to
suppress for seventy years, was in full swing.''104 Yet the history sketched
above reveals limitations on the capability of legal definitions to provide a
coherent Cherokee identity today for all of the Nation's stakeholders.
When the Freedmen were adopted into the Nation by the Treaty of
1866, they enjoyed in theory all the legal benefits of citizenship. Indeed,
the Nation's amendment of its Constitution that year indicates the tribe's
intent to confer those benefits on its former slaves and their descendants.
However, no sooner were economic resources available than the tribe
began to protest the inclusion of the Freedmen in their distribution, dis-
criminating between political rights as citizens (which the tribe readily
acknowledged belonged to the Freedmen) and economic rights that per-
tained only to "native Cherokees." Time and again in the late 1800s,
Congress and courts were called upon to enforce the economic rights of
Freedmen and other "adopted" Cherokees. When confronted with the
terms of the Treaty of 1866, the tribe countered that the Treaty was forced
upon it, so its obligation to adopt the Freedmen and grant citizenship to
102. The racial and biological underpinnings of the Dawes Rolls themselves are ana-
lyzed infra notes 217-241 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
104. WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE
217 (1993).
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them and their descendants should not be binding; °5 an assertion the Lucy
Allen majority considered and dismissed.10 6 The resistance of tribal leader-
ship to recognizing the Cherokees' former slaves and their descendants as
Cherokee citizens meant that roll after roll of Freedmen was drawn up to
ascertain eligible beneficiaries of financial distributions and allotments.
Though legally on the same footing as "native Cherokees," both before
and after the Dawes Rolls, the Freedmen were never recognized by the
tribe as "real" Cherokees.
When the Nation officially reasserted itself in the early 1970s it
quickly took steps to legally exclude an already marginalized social group,
the Freedmen's descendants, by amending the tribal code to require
Dawes Rolls-based proof of Indian "blood quantum" (the CDIB re-
quirement). The Nation no longer admitted, as its counsel did before the
Court of Claims in Whitmire, that the right of the Freedmen and their
descendants to vote or enjoy other political rights of citizenship "has
never been questioned or abridged in the slightest. 1 07 Freedmen's descen-
dants who protested their exclusion have reportedly been told that
"Freedmen were compensated with allotments, unlike freed slaves in the
South after the American Civil War"'08 as though they had bargained
105. The Lucy Allen dissent asserted that "the majority opinion fails to point out that
the Treaty of 1866 and the 1866 amendment to the 1839 Constitution of the Cherokee
Nation which was a direct result of the [fact that the] 1866 Treaty was brought about by
duress from the United States Federal Government after the Cherokee Nation chose the
losing side of the Civil War.... My colleagues in the majority opinion have failed to cite
any instance where the Cherokee Nation voluntarily granted citizenship to the Cherokee
Freedman prior to and after 1866." Lucy Allen,JAT-04-09 at 29 (Matlock, C.J., dissenting).
See also supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing the comments of former Chero-
kee Nation Deputy Chief Ketcher).
106. The LucyAllen majority stated that
[A]lthough this treaty was signed at the end of the Civil War, when the
Cherokee Nation was in a weaker bargaining position, it is nonetheless an
agreement between two sovereign nations. When the Cherokee Nation en-
ters into treaties with other nations, we expect the other sovereign to live up
to the promises they make. It is rightly expected that we will also keep the
promises we make.
Lucy Allen,JAT-04-09 at 17-18. The Court also reminded the Nation that "[t]he fact that
internal Cherokee laws were amended to acknowledge the Cherokee Nation's compliance
with the 1866 Treaty should not be ignored." Id. at 19. Elsewhere, however, the majority
seems to draw back from its flat conclusion that the Nation should "keep the promises we
make," and questions "whether the Cherokee Nation, like other sovereigns, has the inter-
nal power to unilaterally abrogate treaties." Id. at 20.The majority adds in dicta that "[t]his
Court sees no reason why the Cherokee Nation must be bound by a treaty until the end
of time, particularly when that treaty has been broken by the other sovereign," but cau-
tions that abrogation of any treaty must be done "by clear actions which are consistent
with the Cherokee Nation Constitution," not by "mere implication." Id.
107. Whitmire, 30 Ct. Cl. at 148. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
108. Freedmen Statement, supra note 19.
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away their citizenship for land, or "Freedmen did not help during the last
[one] hundred years to rebuild the Cherokee Nation and should not at
this late date reap any benefits that Cherokees have earned,"' °9 ignoring
the counterpoints that either the Freedmen's help in rebuilding the Na-
tion was seldom welcomed, or Freedmen did in fact help rebuild the
Nation.' °
From the above it is clear that the legal definition of Cherokee iden-
tity since 1866 has failed to produce legitimized Cherokee social
identities for Freedmen's descendants."' Although the legal definition of
Cherokees, as provided for by the Treaty of 1866 and the constitutional
amendments of 1866, granted "native Cherokees" Freedmen, and other
adoptees citizenship in one and the same polity, neither then nor since
have Cherokees by "blood" and Freedmen shared the same Cherokee so-
cial identity or even compatible Cherokee social identities. My brief
review of the history of the Cherokee Nation since Reconstruction indi-
cates that each time major financial or political opportunities have arisen,
"native Cherokees" have striven to distinguish themselves as a social sub-
set of the common citizenry and accrue to themselves control of these
opportunities to realize their vision of the Nation.
With the amendment of the Cherokee Constitution to impose an
"Indian blood" requirement, the Cherokee Nation may be heading at last
toward an isomorphism of one set of its members' social identities (as bio-
logical Cherokees) and their political identity (as Cherokee citizens). If
the results of the election stand, the Freedmen's descendants will be hived
off and rendered invisible from the standpoint of the Nation's organic
document and tribal code. But the attempted resolution of the Nation's
political crisis by legal simplification could come at a significant social
cost, not least because the public debate thus far has avoided or disavowed
the role of perhaps the most important variable of all: race.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., supra note 23 (describing the example of Freedman's descendant Leslie
Ross whose grandfather Stick Ross served on the Council (the "lower" half of the Chero-
kee legislature, the "upper" half being the Senate)). The roster of Cherokee Council
members in the late nineteenth century includes six who are designated as "negro" in
Emmet Starr's authoritative history: Joseph Brown (1875), Ned Irons (1895) (from Tahle-
quah District); Frank Vann (1887), Samuel Stidham (1895) (both from Illinois District);
Jerry Alberty (1889) (Cooweescoowee District). EMMErT STARR, HISTORY OF THE CHERO-
KEE INDIANS AND THEIR LEGENDS AND FOLK LORE 277-83 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1977)
(1921).
111. See STURm, supra note 67, at 105 ("Cherokee blood policies constitute the
Cherokee Nation in a legal and political sense but ... these legal definitions do not corre-
spond with sociocultural realities at the local level.").
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C. Cherokee Identity: Biological Definitions and their Limits
The Lucy Allen Court, in rejecting the validity of the tribal code's
"Indian blood"-based citizenship criteria, distinguished the Nation as a
political sovereign from the tribe as a biologically-linked community, and
in so doing, pointed to the rich and complex network of races and socie-
ties that have traditionally made up the Cherokee Nation's polity:
[Tihe Cherokee nation is a Sovereign.The Cherokee Nation is
much more than just a group of families with a common an-
cestry. For almost 150 years, the Cherokee Nation has included
not only citizens that are Cherokee by blood, but also citizens
who have origins in other Indian nations and/or African
and/or European ancestry. Many of these citizens are mixed
race and a small minority of these citizens possess no Cherokee
blood at all.
112
I advert to the Cherokee Nation's traditionally varied racial and
ethnic composition not to argue that tribal policies should reflect the past,
and therefore efforts to amend the Constitution to impose a "blood" re-
quirement for citizenship are inappropriate. As a citizen of the Cherokee
Nation, I agree with legal scholar Carole Goldberg that the "contempo-
rary concerns of tribal communities" must be the touchstone for setting
citizenship criteria, and "there is no reason to deny" the legitimacy of cri-
teria based on such concerns "merely because they depart from
'traditional' measures."'1 3 At the same time, clearing the field of methodo-
logical attachments to traditions of citizenship raises the question for the
Cherokee Nation's voters-and for no one else-of how we should
evaluate biology as a criterion for citizenship, especially where our tribal
history includes slave-holding and our northeastern Oklahoma roots are
still fed in significant ways by the culture of the South.!
1 4
112. Lucy Allen, JAT-04-09 at 9. The Court continued: "People will always disagree
on who is culturally Cherokee and who possess enough Cherokee blood to be 'racially'
Indian. It is not the role of this Court to engage in these political or social debates." Id. at
10.
113. Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian
Nations, 50 KAN. L. Rv. 437,438 (2002).
114. See STruRM, supra note 67, at 14 ("Most Cherokees consider Oklahoma their
home in the fullest sense of the word, but almost all look back to the South, to their abo-
riginal homeland.... Many never get a chance to go back, but those geographic, historical,
and cultural origins continually visit their imaginations and shape their identities in com-
plex ways.").
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1. The Construction of the "Red" Race
"Race," Circe Sturm writes, "is not a natural, biological, or scientific
category. Instead, it is a social, historical, and political category defined in
biological terms.'" In his important study of the construction of White-
ness as a prerequisite for United States citizenship, legal scholar Ian Haney
Lopez defines "race" as "the historically contingent social systems of
meaning that attach to elements of morphology and ancestry."'1 6 Lopez
elaborates his understanding of race along three "interrelated levels, the
physical, the social, and the material":
[F]irst, race turns on physical features and lines of descent, not
because features or lineage themselves are a function of racial
variation, but because society has invested these with racial
meanings. Second, because the meanings given to certain fea-
tures and ancestries denote race, it is the social processes of
ascribing racialized meanings to faces and forbearers that lie at
the heart of racial fabrication. Third, these meaning-systems,
while originally only ideas, gain force as they are reproduced
in the material conditions of society.The distribution of wealth
and poverty turns in part on the actions of social and legal ac-
tors who have accepted ideas of race, with the resulting
material conditions becoming part of and reinforcement for
the contingent meanings understood as race.
'
1
7
The relationship of law to race is not merely regulatory, it is produc-
tive. On all three levels-physical, social, and material-law operates to
assign meaning to bodies and ancestry. As Lopez states, "The legal system
influences what we look like, the meanings ascribed to our looks, and the
material reality that confirms the meanings of our appearances. Law con-
structs race."""
The construction of racial identities through the dividing practices
of plantation slave-holding and resistance to it established patterns of so-
cial interaction that would reproduce themselves long after 1866 and the
end of slavery itself. My focus in this section and the next will be on the
115. Id. at 14-15.
116. IAN E HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 14 (N.
Y Univ. Press 1996). See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HAsv. L. REv.
1707, 1715-45 (1993) (on evolution ofWhiteness as a form of racial identity to a form of
property and status); Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity: An Essay on
"Indigeneity" and "Whiteness," 18 WASH. U.J.L. & PoL'Y 55, 63 (2005) (arguing for expan-
sion of dialogue on Whiteness to colonialism and its global power over indigenous
peoples' resources).
117. LOPEZ, supra note 116, at 14.
118. Id. at 19.
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Cherokees developed their
own forms of colonial and early-American slave-holding inflected by tra-
ditional Cherokee culture and Euroamerican notions of citizenship. " 9 In
the process, Cherokees reproduced and politically imbedded the practices
by which racialized meanings were assigned to the faces and forbearers of
African-descended men and women, Euroamericans, and themselves.
The construction of Cherokees as "red men" was not a self-reflexive
act of an indigenous people, but was performed by Europeans and Eu-
roamericans according to preexisting racial narratives, drawn from
Christian monogenetic and Enlightenment sources, which esteemed
Whiteness, loathed Blackness, and sought the salvation and civilization of
all. 12 In 1728, for example, Virginia planter William Byrd wrote, "All Na-
tions of men have the same Natural Dignity, and we all know that very
bright Talents may be lodg'd under a very dark Skin. The principal Differ-
ence between one People and another proceeds only from the different
Opportunities of Improvement. '1 2' By the end of the eighteenth century,
however, "Cherokees had begun to internalize some ideas of race as fun-
damental to their own identity."1 2 2 They had incorporated "an
understanding of racial difference and racial prejudice that articulated
with Western views.... [H]uman differences that Cherokees had once
understood in terms of color symbolism, culture, politics, and kinship
were now also understood in terms of race":
[R]ed, [W]hite, and [B]lack had become racial categories "be-
cause the Cherokees described the origins of difference as
[being] innate, the product of separate creations, and they
119. See JACK D. FORBES, AFRICANs AND NATIVE AMERICANS: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE
AND THE EVOLUTION OF RED-BLACK PEOPLES 190-220 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1993) (docu-
menting the early history of the social construction of African-Native American peoples).
See also WILLIAM LOREN KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERITAGE 135-40 (Atheneum
1986) (examining slavery in the "Five Civilized Nations").
120. Scholar of ethnicity and African American studies Tiya Miles writes, "[The]
system of White superiority was nourished by an ideology of White supremacy that per-
vaded the rhetoric and writing of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English.
Historian Winthrop Jordan [argues] that the English saw Africans as '[Bilack,' a descriptor
that, for them, connoted evil, bestiality, and filth." Tiya Miles, Uncle Tom Was an Indian: Trac-
ing the Red in Black Slavery, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE: THE INDIAN-BLACK
EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA 137, 141-42 (James F Brooks ed., 2002) (citing WIN-
THROP JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE UNITED
STATES 48 (Oxford Univ. Press 1974)). See STURM, supra note 67, at 44 (describing mono-
genesis as a theological construct).
121. THEDA PERDUE, "MIXED BLOOD" INDIANS: RACIAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE EARLY
SOUTH 71 (2003) (quoting WILLIAM BYRD, WILLIAM BYRD's HISTORIES Or THE DIVIDING
LiNE BETWIXTVIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA 120 (William K. Boyd ed., Dover Publica-
tions 1967) (1929)).
122. STuRm, supra note 67, at 47.
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spoke of skin color as if it were a meaningful index of
difference."
123
Indeed, skin color was a meaningful index of difference: Cherokees
of the late eighteenth century were engaged in "racial fabrication" by as-
cribing social meaning to their own "faces and forbearers" (Lopez) and
the physiognomy and lineage of those around them. On some occasions,
Cherokees attempted to simultaneously accept their classification as "red"
and subvert the Euroamerican hierarchy of White over red by appealing
to shared norms of theology and longevity on the land. For example, pre-
siding over the Treaty of Hopewell in 1785, Cherokee Chief Old Tassel
reminded his American interlocutors, "I am made of this earth, on which
the great man above placed me, to possess it .... You must know the red
people are the aborigines of this land, and that it is but a few years since
the [W]hite people found it out. I am of the first stock, as the commis-
sioners know, and a native of this land; and the [W]hite people are now
living on it as our friends.0
2 4
At the same time, with the support of American policies of"civiliza-
tion," Cherokees were increasingly intermarrying with Euroamericans.
Indeed, the socially-approved practice of intermarriage between
Euroamerican men and Native American women was of longstanding.
For nearly two centuries, Euroamerican officials and missionaries held up
the example of the Virginian John Rolfe, who married Pocahontas, the
daughter of Algonquian Chief Powhatan, in 1614, as proof of the advan-
tages that could accrue to both Euroamericans (in terms of peace and
economic gain) and Native Americans (in terms of cultural and religious
"betterment") if they "blended their stocks" in marriage. 25 So beneficial
were these unions regarded for British colonial interests that government
officials in 1755 urged a policy of relocating Euroamerican soldiers and
convicts to the frontier to serve as marriage partners for Native American
123. Id. at 50 (quoting Nancy Shoemaker, How Indians Got to Be Red, 102 AM. HIsT.
REV. 625, 643 (1997)).
124. STuRM, supra note 67, at 47-48 (quoting Old Tassel, Cherokee Chief, Remarks at
the Council for the Treaty of Hopewell, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, CLASS 2: INDIAN
AFFAIRs 41 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1832)).
125. PERDUE, supra note 121, at 72-73. As William Byrd expressed the point, "A
sprightly Lover is the most prevailing Missionary." Id. at 75. Before marrying Rolfe, Poca-
hontas converted to Christianity and changed her name to Rebecca, then followed her
husband to England, where she lived the life of a Jacobean lady until her death. She is buried
in England. Perdue states that "her son and his descendants ethnically identified as [Wihite
even as they boasted descent from Pocahontas." Id. at 73. See Pocahontas, Jamestown Redis-
covery, http://www.apva.org/history/pocahont.html (showing a contemporary portrait of
Pocahontas-Rebecca,Jacobean lady, and an account of her life).
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women. 116 Similarly, early United States policy endorsed by Thomas Jef-
ferson, among others, favored intermarriage between settlers and Native
Americans as a means assimilating the latter to the "civilized" culture and
mores of the former.'27 The phenomenon of Euro and Native American
intermarriage may be attributed in part to the view prevalent through the
eighteenth century that "red" skin resulted from environmental causes and
did not reflect fundamental differences between the two groups: the Indi-
ans' application of "bear's oil, or grease, mixt with a certain red root,
which, by a peculiar property, is able alone, in a few years time, to produce
the Indian colour in those who are [W]hite born.' 2 "Europeans," histo-
rian Theda Perdue states, "refused to admit that Indians possessed
genetically darker skin.'
29
The accommodation, indeed cultivation, of Indian-White intermar-
riage of this period illustrates Lopez's point that race is physically
constructed by laws and policies that constrain or facilitate reproductive
choices:
[W]hile admittedly laws cannot alter the biology governing
human morphology, rule-makers can and have altered human
behavior that produces variations in physical appearance. In
other words, laws have directly shaped reproductive choices.2
An example of such law-shaped variations is the phenomenon of
"mixed bloods:' As a result of government-encouraged Indian-White in-
termarriage, and later the Cherokee's own legal codes permitting White-
Cherokee unions, 3 ' generations of Cherokee children were racially con-
structed as "mixed-bloods." Purdue writes that, "Unlike their [W]hite
neighbors, Native people had no category for 'mixed-bloods' and almost
never used the term. On the rare occasion when they did, 'half-breed'
described or personified departures from traditional ways of doing things
126. In 1755, Edmund Aikin, in a report on colonial Indian affairs, urged the inter-
marriage of soldiers stationed on the frontier with Indian women "by which means our
Interest among the Indians will be strengthened." Akins also recommended that "able bod-
ied men Convicts of petty crimes, instead of being hanged, or incorporated among the
People of our Colonies" be sent to the frontier to marry Indian women and "strengthen
the peace." PERDUE, supra note 121, at 73.
127. Id. at 73-74. Thomas Jefferson favored intermarriage of Indian women and
White men to promote civilization, as did his Indian agents for the Creek and the Chero-
kee, Benjamin Hawkins and Return Meigs, respectively. See id. at 74-76.
128. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 47.
129. Id. at 46.
130. LoPEz, supra note 116, at 14-15.
131. STum, supra note 67, at 54 ("As citizens of a new multiracial nation, Cherokees
were willing to accept intermarriages between themselves and [W]hites but not with Afri-
can American slaves.").
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rather than identifying particular individuals by race."13 2 For Euroameri-
cans of the early nineteenth century, however, mixed-bloods could be
unsettling, liminal beings, confusing at times in their appearance,1 con-
stantly in need of authoritative surveillance 1 34 and racial coding.13 ' At the
same time, "mixed-blood" Cherokees who were familiar with Euroameri-
can culture could be especially effective in negotiating the interests of the
Nation. The "mixed-blood" Cherokee Principal Chief John Ross,
"[a]lthough only 1/8 Cherokee, ... was reared traditionally and had a
preference for native clothing and mode of dressing as a boy and young
man. He was educated in mission schools and at private boarding
schools.' 136 Ross was highly acculturated as a Cherokee, and moved easily
between cultures during successive national crises during his nearly forty-
year tenure as principal chief, serving in major leadership roles from 1828
to his death in 1886.137
132. PERDIUE, supra note 121, at 90. The only group of "mixed-bloods," according to
Perdue, which Native people treated distinctively was children born to "Indian men and
[W]hite women who had not been adopted into clans." Id. at 94. Under the matrilineal
rules of many tribes, including the Cherokee, children of Native American mothers are
automatically members of their mother's clan, regardless of their paternity. Children of
Native American fathers and non-Native mothers, therefore, must be adopted into clans to
receive Native American familial status.
133. In the case of mixed-blood Indian-White children, color was often a poor proxy
for race. Perdue reports that "outsiders" often had difficulty "distinguishing 'full-bloods'
and 'mixed-bloods,' " adding, "the eccentricity of genes created a 'diversity of complexion'
that made skin tone an ... imperfect determinant of ancestry." Id. at 91. See HARRY J.
BROWN, INJUN JOE'S GHOST: THE INDIAN MIXED-BLOOD IN AMERICAN WRITING 20 (2004)
(discussing "popular nationalist literature such as produced by Twain and Cooper registers
Indian-[W]hite hybridity in images of degeneracy, atavism, madness, violence, or criminal-
ity.").
134. Missionaries identified school children according to ancestry, on church rolls
headed "pedigree," and carefully noted their blood as "full" or "mixed blood." See PERmUE,
supra note 121, at 88.
135. See the anecdotes id. at 75 (missionaries in 1822 praise mixed-bloods "instructed
in letters and religion ... christianized and civilized" while criticizing White children "to-
tally ignorant of letters and of religion"); 91 (missionaries in 1824 express perplexity that
"some of the full Indians are so light, that, if protected from the weather as much of the
people as our own country, they would not differ many shades from a dark Englishman.").
136. John Ross, Cherokee Nation, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section =
culture&culture=culinfo&cat=yOCwb%207dflB4=&ID=8sPG9ZCF7PE = .
137. Id. Known in Cherokee as "Koo-wi-s-gu-wi" (or Cooweescoowee"), Ross is
widely considered the greatest of the Cherokee chiefs for his leadership of the Nation
during the trauma of Removal and the Civil War. Ross's ancestry was seven-eighths Scot-
tish and one-eighth Cherokee. See WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, AFTER THE TRAIL OF TEARS:
THE CHEROKEES' STRUGGLE FOR SovEREiGNTY, 1839-1880 3 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1993).
Nonetheless, Ross was widely respected among culturally conservative Cherokees for his
resistance to Removal. See GRACE STEELE WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES 132 (Univ. of Okla.
Press 1963) ("though only an eighth-blood, [he] was inwardly all Cherokee.").
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In summary, as the nineteenth century began, Cherokees had
adopted two, complementary race-based strategies for dealing with the
new Republic and the insatiable demands of Euroamerican settlers for
tribal lands. On the one hand, Cherokees appear to have accepted their
racial construction as "red," but resisted, even inverted, the Euroamerican
hierarchy of races that subordinated red to White. On the other hand,
Cherokees increasingly took on the customs, dress, manners and appear-
ance of Euroamericans, and through intermarriage with them, "coded"
increasingly as White. These Cherokees, many though not all of them of
"mixed-blood" ascended to leadership positions in the tribe, and, with
"full-bloods," endeavored to negotiate their traditional Cherokee self-
understanding as "the principal people"'138 by participating in the vernacu-
lar of Euroamerican culture and the institutions of the Southern colonies,
later states. 139 Consequently, the road to Cherokee prosperity for some
would lead through the political institution of the nation-state, and the
economic engine of plantation slavery.
2.The Construction of "Black" by "Red"
Lopez reminds us that the specification of faces and forbearers in
terms of race relies upon social meaning-systems which, "while originally
only ideas, gain force as they are reproduced in the material conditions of
society." 40 Cherokees, who adopted and strategically adapted Euroameri-
can notions of race and "redness" in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, appear to have easily embraced Euroamerican bias against Black
skin when they encountered it in the bodies of African slaves, and to have
interpreted it immediately as a sign of intrinsically inferior social status.
4
1
138. JAMES MOONEY, MOONEY'S HISTORY, MYTIIS, AND SACRED FORMUrLAS OF THE
CHEROKEES 15 (Historical Images 1992) (1900) ("The proper name by which the Chero-
kees call themselves [is Ani-Yun-Wiya] ... signifying 'real people' or 'principal people'....
[T]he word properly denotes 'Indians,' as distinguished from people of other races, but in
usage it is restricted to mean members of the Cherokee tribe....").
139. Historians McLoughlin and Conser caution, however, that "[o]ne must avoid the
easy conclusion that the wealthy, mixed-blood elite was necessarily the ruling body or
oligarchy of the Cherokee Nation at this time [ca. 18351"William G. McLoughlin &Wal-
ter H. Conser, Jr., The Cherokees in Transition: A Statistical Analysis of the Federal Cherokee
Census of 1835, 64 J. Am. HisT. 678, 698 (1977). As checks on any potential oligarchy, the
Cherokee government finctioned through a bicameral legislature, where "[bly tradition
and design, the Cherokees consistently gave the well-to-do a larger role in the upperhouse
while retaining popular control of the lowerhouse," and, in addition, the Cherokee fol-
lowed their tradition "that all decisions affecting the general welfare of the tribe or nation
should be taken only after long debate had produced a consensus." Id.
140. LopEz, supra note 116, at 14.
141. See Wiliam G. McLoughlin, Red Indians, Black Slavery and White Racism:America's
Slaveholding Indians, 26 AM. Q. 367, 371 (1974) ("The first time that Indians ever saw
[B]lack men they appeared as the slaves of Spanish, French or English masters. Conse-
quently, without any planned policy of divide and rule, the [W]hite man showed the
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While Cherokees initially had no concept of race, 142 "[s]oon after their
first contact with Africans ... the Cherokees no doubt realized that Euro-
peans regarded Blacks as inferiors and they were in danger of receiving
the same treatment.' 43 Indeed, "[t]he English colonists purchased their
first cargo of Africans at about the same time they began enslaving Indi-
,,144
ans.
The enslavement of Native Americans peaked during 1715-1717
and declined until it officially ended after the American Revolution.
4
1
While the Indian slave-trade flourished, the powerful Cherokees, while
sometimes victims of capture and sale, turned away from their aboriginal
system of warfare (which operated in the service of clan-based retributive
justice) 146 and became adept market participants in the capture and trading
of Indians of neighboring tribes, such as the Yuchi and Guale, to Europe-
ans. As a result, traditional Cherokee society, which operated economically
on subsistence farming and hunting, changed forever, as Cherokees be-
came increasingly dependent on the Western market goods they received
in exchange for captive Indians.'
47
As the market for Indian slaves declined, Cherokees shifted to cap-
turing and trading Black slaves, having "discovered that the capture of
[B]lack slaves was particularly profitable, and by the American Revolution
most Cherokees traded almost exclusively in [B]lack slaves."' 48 When Afri-
can slaves ran away, their owners commonly employed Native Americans,
including Cherokees, to retrieve their lost property. 49 Fearing alliances
between Native Americans and African slaves, the colonists "not only em-
ployed Indians to find escaped slaves but also used [B]lacks in military
Indian by his actions that he considered darker people inferior to [W]hite-skinned peo-
ple.").
142. See PaRDuE, supra note 77, at 3-18 (describing the tribal and ontological status of
the atsi nahsa'i, or bondsmen, owned by aboriginal Cherokees, and why they should not
categorized as "slaves" in the modern sense).
143. Id. at 36.
144. Id. at 36-37.
145. Id. at 37.
146. See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM
CLAN TO COURT 10-39 (1975) (elaborating traditional Cherokee justice norms based on
clan revenge); Rennard Strickland, Wolf Warriors and Turtle Kings: Native American Law Before
the Blue Coats, 72 WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1045-46 (1997) (arguing traditional Cherokees
were highly legalistic and lived under a value-based jurisprudence according to sacred
norms).
147. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 22.
148. Id. at 38.
149. Id. at 39-40 ("In 1763 [W]hites agreed to pay Indians one musket and three
blankets, the equivalent of thirty-five deerskins, for each [B]lack slave captured and re-
turned.").
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campaigns against Indians."" ° As historian William McLoughlin explains,
"[W]hite colonial governors, settlers, and Army commanders in the Caro-
linas in the eighteenth century deliberately spread scare stories of Indian
cruelty among their slaves, armed slaves to kill Indians and paid Indians to
capture and return runaway slaves .... [all as] a conscious and calculated
part of [W]hite policy in the years when the Indians and [B]lacks in the
Southeast outnumbered the [W]hite settlers and could, together, have
wiped out the [W]hites."" ' Throughout the eighteenth century,
[c]onvinced that the European and native Americans were
practically identical, [W]hites simultaneously insisted that Afri-
cans were the exact opposite of Europeans and Indians. By
emphasizing the actual, exaggerated, and imagined differences
between Africans and Indians, [W]hites successfully masked the
cultural similarities of the two as well as their mutual exploita-
tion by [W]hites. '52
Their culture now deeply committed to the economic system of the
colonists, Cherokees readily ascribed inferior status to Black skin, which
they associated exclusively with objects of the hunt, capture, and trade
with Whites; or as agents of warfare waged against them by White masters.
Their early participation in the Indian slave-trade had taught Cherokees
to transform certain persons into commodities. Now, at the end of the
eighteenth century, whether as goods in the marketplace or tools of the
fight, Black bodies were first and foremost instruments of labor under the
exclusive control of another-the very definition of slaves. In contrast to
slave-objects, Cherokees were subjects who enjoyed intersubjective rela-
tions with Whites, intermarrying with them, studying their language and
culture, and benefiting from ideologies of philosophy, religion, and law
that, for a while yet, classified "White men" and "red men" as brothers, if
not equals, "under the skin." The monogenetic premise of a common
humanity, however, would soon change, and "blood would tell."
3. Cherokee Slavery and Cherokee Nation
Two major shifts, one socio-economic, the other political, occurred in
the Cherokee Nation in the nineteenth century that bear particularly on
today's Freedmen controversy The first was the adoption of plantation slav-
ery and the second was the adoption of the progressive political form of the
nation. The two are historically related in that many of the same individuals
who formed the economic, largely mixed-blood elite who owned signifi-
cant landed estates were the most ardent supporters of nationhood and the
150. Id. at 41.
151. McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 369-70.
152. PERDtE, supra note 77, at 47.
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specification of Cherokee political identity in terms of citizenship. Chero-
kees of the antebellum South contributed to the empowerment of a race-
based economy by simultaneously exercising authority over race-
subordinates and negotiating their own identities under the conditions of
White colonization.
a. Race as Economics
The Cherokees in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
occupied aboriginal lands located largely in northwestern Georgia and
southeastern Tennessee. l1 3 At an estimated 12,000-15,000 population, they
were one of the largest tribes in the Southeastern United States.1 s4 They
were also the wealthiest tribe, having sold extensive tracts of their land
after 1777."5 The availability of capital, combined with a government pol-
icy favoring Indian "civilization" through yeoman husbandry,1 16 and their
own ardent desire to acquire Western technical knowledge and equip-
ment,157 moved the Cherokees rapidly from an economy based on
subsistence farming and hunting and to one based on the production of
surplus agricultural products for market."5 " In the process, many Chero-
kees abandoned traditional gender roles which assigned agricultural
cultivation and hunting to women's and men's labor, respectively. With
game scarce and warfare ended, Cherokee men turned to agriculture, and
in so doing, alienated Cherokee women from the "real economic power"
they had previously enjoyed.5 9 Once labor was re-gendered, and only
153. McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 380.
154. Id.
155. Id. ("Though [the Cherokee] lost much of their original land after 1777 in
various treaties, they generally struck shrewd bargains for it... ") See WILLIAM G.
McLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEw REPUBLIC 19, 24, 46, 77, & 91
(Princeton Univ. Press 1986) (discussing annuities to the Cherokee generated by sales of
tribal land and rights-of-way from 1777 to 1804 (proceeds included trade goods, cash, and
annuities from federal government promised in perpetuity)).
156. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 53-54 (citing George Washington's proposal to the
Cherokees for transition to an agricultural economy, as a means of their "civilization").
157. Id. at 54 (citing report of Indian agent that "the Cherokees avidly sought the
tools of civilization").
158. See McLoughlin & Conser, supra note 139, at 680 ("[By 1835] Cherokees were
indeed far advanced in the acquisition of wealth and skills and .. . those with a high pro-
portion of mixed Cherokee-[W]hite ancestry tended to have more skills and more wealth.
It also appears that there was a definite trend toward an agrarian-capitalist social order, that
economic classes were beginning to appear, and that communal life, the clan system, and
the extended family were fading.").
159. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 52. See generally MooNEY, supra note 138, at 242-48
(describing traditional Cherokee gender roles which associate agriculture with women
and hunting with men, based in tribal stories of origination: Selu, the first woman, was
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then, Perdue argues, the door opened for Cherokee slave labor and the
plantation system: "Only when the identification of women with agricul-
ture had ended was the introduction and utilization of slave labor for
cultivation by even a minority of Cherokees possible."'6
Statistics from the period show that as the Cherokee population
grew in the first 60 years of the nineteenth century the number of slaves
of Cherokees, and slaves of Cherokees as a percentage of the Cherokee
population, grew as well. McLoughlin reports the following data:...
YEAR CHEROKEE SLAVES OF SLAVES OF CHEROKEES
POPULATION CHEROKEES (AS PERCENT OF
(ROUNDED) (NUMBER) CHEROKEE POPULATION)
1809 12,000 583 4.85%
1825 14,000 1,277 9.12%
1835 15,000 1,592 10.61%
1860 17,000 4,000 23.52%
According to the census of 1835, "[s]laveholders cultivated more
acres and produced more corn than nonslaveholding Cherokees, and they
owned most of the nascent industries in the Nation.' 162 With profits from
the sale of excess agricultural product, Cherokees invested in various en-
terprises, such as mills and ferries.1 6 ' The number of slaves owned per
plantation, however, was not large: of the 207 slaveholders in 1835, "168,
or 83 percent, owned fewer than 10 slaves."'164 Nonetheless, in 1835,
Cherokees were significant slave-holders compared to the other tribes of
the southeastern United States, and after Removal, the Cherokee held
more slaves than any other tribe in Indian Territory. 16 5
Significantly, ownership of Black slaves was not evenly distributed
across the Cherokee population according to race. "Mixed-bloods" owned
a disproportionately high share of the slaves. Perdue reports that "[o]nly
physically the source of corn, which she produced from her body, and Kana'ti, the first
man, was the provider of game, which he stored in the ground and withdrew as needed).
160. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 53.
161. McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 380. Calculation of slaves as percent of Cherokee
population my own. Other sources place the number of Cherokee slaves in 1860 lower
than McLoughlin. See R. HALLIBURTONJR., RED OVER BLACK: BLACK SLAVERY AMONG THE
CHEROKEE INDIANS 117 (1977) (slaves of Cherokees in 1860 equal 2504); LITTLEFIELD,
supra note 8, at 9 (slaves of Cherokees in 1860 equal 2511). Even assuming the lowest fig-
ure (2504), slaves as a percent of the Cherokee population rose significantly post-Removal.
I do not mean to imply that slaves were counted as part of the Cherokee population; they
were not. However, like illegal aliens in the United States today, their numbers were in-
creasing significantly as a function of the majority (Cherokee) population and posing
correspondingly greater challenges of cultural integration and social "management."
162. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 60.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 58.
165. LITTLEFIELD, supra note 8, at 8.
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17 percent of the people living in the Cherokee Nation in 1835 had any
[W]hite ancestors, but 78 percent of the members of families owning
slaves had some proportion of [W]hite blood.' '166 Missionaries of the time
referred to "the half-breeds [who] have large plantations, which they cul-
tivate by the aid of slaves."' 67 It would misleading, however, to suggest that
Cherokee plantation slavery at this time was exclusively the provenance of
wealthy "White-Cherokees" where some "full-bloods" (albeit a minor-
ity)'68 also participated in the system.1
69
The emergence of "mixed-blood" Cherokees in Euroamerican soci-
ety in the early part of the nineteenth century is nonetheless remarkable.
In addition to success in the economic sphere, many "mixed-bloods" ne-
gotiated hybridic Cherokee identities'70 through intermarriage with
[W]hites,' conversion to Christianity, adoption of Western-style manners
and dress, and the achievement of fluency in written and spoken Eng-
lish.'7 As Perdue notes, "Contact with a [W]hite parent or grandparent
gave these people a head start toward 'civilization,' and it influenced them
to identify linguistically with [W]hite society."'13 Economic prosperity
166. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 60.
167. PERDUE, supra note 121, at 96.
168.
[S]lavery did not permeate the Cherokee tribe but was concentrated in the
hands of a very few: only 7.4 percent of tribal members held slaves. Slave-
holders were concentrated in the more mixed-blood Cherokee communities
and among the more mixed-blood families: only 1 percent of all full-blood
families owned slaves.... This, of course, was because more mixed-blood
families were wealthier and engaged in plantation agriculture.
THORNTON, supra note 50, at 53 (analyzing data from the 1835 census).
169. Srtuv, supra note 67, at 56 ("Although we can discern some correlation be-
tween [W]hite racial ancestry, a higher class standing, and slave ownership, there were also
significant exceptions.").
170. The term "hybridities" appears in postcolonial theory and refers to those mo-
ments "when the scenario written by colonialism is given a performance by the native
that estranges and undermines the colonialist script." Benita Perry, Problems in Current
Theories of Colonial Discourse, in THE POsT-COLONIAL STUDIES READER 36, 42 (Bill Ashcroft
et al. eds., 1995). See S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the Challenge of Kennewick
Man, 79 ThMp. L. RE. 89, 117-18 (2006) (discussing examples of Cherokee hybridities in
the nineteenth century).
171. Perdue reports that "[wihen the United States government embarked on its
policy of'civilization' ... many Cherokees came to view matrilineal kinship as an aspect of
their 'savage' existence which had to be abandoned. Consequently Cherokees began prac-
ticing the European pattern of inheritance, and in 1808 the council pledged 'to give
protection to children as heirs to their father's property and to the widow's share.'"
PERDUE, supra note 77, at 51.
172. PERDUE, supra note 121, at 87.
173. PERDm, supra note 77, at 60. The 1835 census shows English literacy positively
correlated with slaveholding: "Among the people living in slaveholding families ... 39
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through the plantation economy and successful negotiation of Cherokee
identities under the conditions of Euroamerican cultural colonialism, es-
pecially by "mixed-bloods," gave the Cherokees their reputation at the
time as "the 'most civilized' of all the Indian nations.' 74 As McLoughlin
and Conser observe, "The Cherokees, in short, were acquiring by 1835,
only a generation after giving up warfare against advancing [W]hite ex-
pansion, a bourgeois socioeconomic structure."17'
However, the establishment of Cherokee identities under the condi-
tions of plantation slavery required Cherokee masters to reproduce and
even intensify racial stigma. Though some scholars have concluded that
Cherokees "probably treated their slaves much better on the average than
did their [W]hite counterparts"1 76 perhaps harkening back to a time be-
fore Cherokees learned to code skin-color as a sign of inferiority,'77 others
have argued that "slavery among the Cherokees was little different from
that in the [W]hite South,' 78 and "some Cherokee masters could be as
cruel and vicious as their [W]hite counterparts.'
79
The success of plantation slavery among an elite of the Cherokees in
the first three decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, required a con-
stellation of factors, among which were: government policies favoring
"civilization" through yeoman husbandry; an influx of capital from the sale
of certain tribal lands; an adequate and reliable supply of productive forces
(land, tools, agricultural knowledge, and African labor); the subordination of
percent could read English, while only 13 percent were proficient at reading Cherokee. In
the case of nonslaveholding Cherokees, less than 4 percent were capable of reading Eng-
lish, and 18 percent could read Cherokee." Id.
174. McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 379. Sturm notes that the plantation economy
created a class-division within the Cherokees between slaveholding "full-bloods" and non-
slaveholding "mixed-bloods" but cautions it would be simplistic to reduce racial orienta-
tion to a proxy for "cultural orientation and social values (i.e., that mixed blood equals
progressive or that full blood equals traditional)." STURM, supra note 67, at 55-57.
175. McLoughlin & Conser, supra note 139, at 697.
176. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 98. See also McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 381 ("It is
generally argued that the Cherokees treated their slaves very leniently."). McLoughlin takes
issue with this claim and asserts treatment of slaves by "red" and "White" masters was
equally variable. Id.
177. "Race as we understand it now was not the determining factor in a person's
tribal identity or tribal membership. Instead, lineage determined belonging. A person who
appeared 'Black' and had a Native American mother would have been defined and ac-
cepted as Indian." Miles, supra note 120, at 145 (referring to early colonial-era matrilineal
kinship systems of Southeastern tribes including the Cherokee).
178. LITTLEFIELD, supra note 8, at 9.
179. Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign Immunity and Toward Repa-
ration and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.LJ. 61, 81 (2005). See also
Terrion L. Williamson, The Plight of "Nappy-Headed" Indians: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty in
the Systematic Discrimination against Black Freedmen by the Federal Government and Native
American Tribes, 10 MICH.J. RACE & L. 233, 240 (2004) ("One explanation for the differ-
ential treatment of Cherokee Freedmen is the Cherokee Nation's adoption of slavery in its
most vicious form.").
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clan-based obligations to the rule of American law; the transformation of
an economy based on hunting and subsistence farming, to one devoted to
the production of surplus goods for sale; the transformation of gendered
labor roles within Cherokee society; and intermarriage with Whites and
the creation of corresponding bonds of intimacy and obligation with the
dominant society.
The productive organization and deployment of these social and
economic opportunities, however, required Cherokee elites to implement
Euroamerican racial hegemonies and a corresponding ideology of "blood"
purity.80 The Cherokee system of plantation slavery was premised on the
Cherokee construction of persons of African descent as ontologically
"other" and inferior to both Indians and Whites, and therefore, like horses
and oxen, as appropriate entities for service in the fields and marketplaces
of their masters. 8' Cherokees had been primed to embrace slavery by
their participation in the Indian slave market of the eighteenth century,
and now, in the nineteenth century, the social place already created for
Black men and women to occupy became an economic space for exploi-
tation by largely "mixed-blood,"White-acculturated Cherokees.'
8 2
This picture of Cherokee social and economic arrangements in the
early nineteenth century, however, has the quality of a negative: it demon-
strates how a subset of'White-acculturated, often "mixed-blood" Cherokees,
a tribal elite of critical historical importance, deployed Euroamerican racial
ideologies to enslave African Americans for profit.Yet this picture is partial.
180. As used in this Article, "hegemonies" refers to the "scripts" of a dominant cul-
ture which are uncritically accepted and enacted by that culture and by the people whom
they oppress. Racial hegemonies, for example, might express themselves in the unreflective
sorting of people into colors, and ranking those colors in terms of status, or assigning
"naturally" good or bad attributes to persons in those categories. Ideologies are based in
hegemonies and have the form of rationalizations, explanations, or justifications of the
status quo. Race science and Social Darwinism in the nineteenth century would be exam-
ples of ideologies based in the mutually reinforcing hegemonies of White, male,
Euroamerican supremacy. On hegemony and its relation to ideology, see STUm, supra note
67, at 19-26 and sources cited therein.
181. On the status of slaves as both property and (legally responsible) persons, see, e.g.,
MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN-
ITY AND INTEREsT 158-69 (1981);Arthur F Howington, Not in the Condition of a Horse or an
Ox: Ford v. Ford, the Law of Testamentary Manumission and the Tennessee Courts' Recognition of
Slave Humanity, 34 TENN. HIST. Q. 249-63 (1975).
182. It is important to observe that significant opposition to Cherokee acculturation
to White society and its institutions existed within the tribe. Usually associated with "fill-
bloods," the antipathy to accommodation received spiritual and political form in the crea-
tion of the Keetoowah Society. The Society united Cherokee religious self-understanding
and nationalism, and has been characterized as "abolitionist" by some, and by others, as
"not being pro-slavery, rather than being anti-slavery." PATRICK N. MINGES, SLAVERY IN THE
CHEROKEE NATION: THE KEETOOWAH SociETY AND THE DEFINING OF A PEOPLE 1855-1867
83 (Routledge 2003).
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It does not reveal in what sense these Native Americans retained and
fought for their identities as Cherokees. To understand this side of the pic-
ture, it is necessary to examine the rationale for the Cherokee Nation.
b. Race as Nation
In the early 1800s, the destabilization of the traditional Cherokee
clan system led to the consolidation of the tribe around the image of the
nation-state.13 As historian Fay Yarbrough observes, "[i]n the nineteenth
century, the strength of the clan system waned, and the concept of legal
citizenship substituted for clan in determining legitimate membership in
the Cherokee Nation."' 8 4 Under the clan system, tribal membership was
conferred by birth to a Cherokee woman; a matrilineal society, the
Cherokee were indifferent to the race of the father where membership
status was concerned. 18 The marginalization of the clan system by Chero-
kee engagement with Euroamerican social, cultural and economic systems
opened the way for new definitions of Cherokee tribal membership; by
adopting a Euroamerican model of government as the tribe's organizing
principle, membership in a Cherokee clan was put in tension with, and,
for many, eventually replaced by, Cherokee citizenship.1
86
The model of the nation served the Cherokees by providing a dual
vantage point from which they could alternately project outward, to the
federal government and to the states of the Union, a self-conception as a
government, one among many, possessing the rights and dignity appropri-
ate to a sovereign. 18 The model of the nation also provided the vantage
183. See STuRm, supra note 67, at 43 ("[The] appropriation and internalization of
Euroamerican notions of racial identity, in addition to concurrent changes in political
organization, helped set the stage for the emergence of Cherokee nationalism in the early
nineteenth century.").
184. Fay Yarbrough, Legislating Women's Sexuality: Cherokee Marriage Laws in the Nine-
teenth Century, 38JOURNAL or SocIAL HISToRY 385, 387 (2004).
185. See id. at 386-87 ("The offspring of unions between Cherokees became mem-
bers of their mother's clan.... Matrilineal kinship meant that Cherokee women who
married non-Cherokee men knew their children would have an undeniable claim to
membership in the Nation. Unions between Cherokee men and non-Cherokee women,
however, produced children with no clan affiliation, and therefore no rights in the Chero-
kee Nation. For much of Cherokee history, being born Cherokee meant being born of a
Cherokee woman.").
186. The supplanting of the clan system by the model of national citizenship varies
among the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokees, and the United Keetoowah
Band. I also would emphasize that many Cherokees, then and now, retain clan affiliations
which are strong sources of personal and group identity.
187. The Cherokee Nation's negotiation of its sovereign identity vis-i-vis the United
States and the State of Georgia resulted in the famous Cherokee Cases of the Marshall
Court. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (Because Indian tribes are
"domestic dependent nations" not "foreign nations" the U.S. Supreme Court has no
original jurisdiction over them under Const. Art. III, § 2); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
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from which the tribe could look inward and assign to itself an identity as a
people according to its own lights. The political identity of the Cherokee
Nation would reflect both: a sovereign among nations and a people set
apart.
From the start the national design intentionally imitated key features
of the United States federal government and the ideology of rights:
[I]n the first three decades of the nineteenth century, [Chero-
kee] leaders established a bicameral legislature, a national police
force, a supreme court, a elective system of representation
based on geographic districts rather than towns, and in 1828, a
written constitution patterned after that of the U.S. federal
government. They also adopted a concept of tribal sovereignty
that "shared much of the ideology of the individual sovereign
states of the Union." ... [Tihe new Cherokee state gradually
displaced town politics, becoming the official administrative,
bureaucratic, and political center of the Cherokees' newly
emerging national community.""
Race, however, became "a cornerstone of the national identity," and
the Cherokee's adoption of the ideology of "race as nation" implied "that
race, or racial metaphors of blood or kinship, could be used to define a
nation 'as a collective subject, as a superorganism with a unique biologi-
cal-cultural essence. ' ' 'The "new Cherokee state would increasingly
replicate the racial ideologies and practices of the U.S. federal and state
governments."' 9 As one of its first steps, the new government, in its Con-
stitution of 1827, denied persons of "the African race" the right to hold
office and the right to vote:
[N]o person shall be eligible to a seat in the General Council,
but a free Cherokee male citizen, who shall have attained to
the age of twenty-five years. The descendants of Cherokee
men by all free women, except the African race, whose parents
may have been living together as man and wife, according to
515, 583 (1832) (Indian tribes are "a separate and distinct people ... vested with rights
which constitute them a state, or separate community-not a foreign, but a domestic
community-not as belonging to the confederacy, but as existing within it.").
188. STURM, supra note 67, at 52-53 (quoting McLoUGHLIN, supra note 155, at xvii).
See also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 189 (Univ. of Neb. Press 1984) (Cherokees in 1827 Constitution
"asserted that they were one of the sovereign and independent nations of the earth with
complete jurisdiction over their own territory").
189. STURM, supra note 67, at 53 (quoting Ana Maria Alonso, The Politics of Space, Time,
and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity, 23 ANNuA. REVIEW OF ANTHRO-
POLOcY 379,384 (1994)).
190. STUPM, supra note 67, at 54.
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the customs and laws of this Nation, shall be entitled to all the
rights and privileges of this nation, as well as the posterity of
Cherokee women by all free men. No person who is of negro
or mulatto parentage, either by the father or mother side, shall
be eligible to hold any office of profit, honor or trust under
this Government. 91
Additionally, "[a]ll free male citizens, (excepting negroes and descendants
of [W]hite and Indian men by negro women who may have been set
free,) who shall have attained to the age of eighteen years, shall be equally
entitled to vote at all public elections."' 92
The exclusion of persons of African descent from Cherokee Nation
office-holding was continued in the successor to the 1827 Constitution,
the post-Removal 1839 Constitution.193 The 1839 Constitution also car-
ried forward the denial of the voting franchise to slaves and women."
Even before adoption of the 1827 Constitution, the Cherokee
Council in the early 18 2 0s passed a series of antimiscegenation laws like
the one enacted in 1824, which prohibited "[i]ntermarriages between
negro slaves, and Indians, or [W]hites," stating such marriages "shall not be
lawful," and providing that anyone permitting "their negro slaves, to in-
termarry with Indians or [W]hites" would be liable to "the Cherokee
Nation" for a fine; and further:
[A]ny male Indian or [W]hite man marrying a negro woman
slave, he or they shall be punished with fifty-nine stripes on
the bare back, and any Indian or [W]hite woman, marrying a
negro man slave, shall be punished with twenty-five stripes. 95
Such statutes had the effect of intensifying the distinction between
Cherokees, here referred to racially as "Indians" in contrast to "negro
slaves" and "Whites." In this way, Cherokee statutory law assigned roles of
191. CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 4 (1827), reprinted in STARR, supra
note 110, at 56.
192. CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 7 (1827), reprinted in STARR, supra
note 110, at 57.
193. See CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 5 (1839), reprinted in STARR, supra
note 110, at 123.
194. See CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 7 (1839), reprinted in STARR, supra
note 110, at 124.
195. STuRM, supra note 67, at 54. The case of Shoe Boots, a Cherokee male who suc-
cessfully petitioned the Council in 1824 to grant citizenship and freedom to his three
children by Doll, his slave, is often cited as an exception to the social prohibition of inti-
mate partnerships between Cherokees and persons of African descent. In granting his
petition, the Council admonished him to father no more children with Doll. See TIYA
MiLEs, TIES THAT BIND: THE STORY OF AN AFRO-CHEROKEE FAMiLY IN SLAVERY AND FREE-
DOM 126 (2005) (examining the story of Shoeboots, Doll, and their family as a study of
race and power in the Cherokee Nation).
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normative intimacy according to a race-based system of meanings. Fur-
ther, while the code produced "Indians," "White men," and "White
women" in terms of race and gender, for Blacks only the code produced
"docile bodies," to use Foucault's famous phrase, along three axes-race,
gender, and servitude: "negro woman slave" and "negro man slave.,1 96 Fi-
nally, while the code constructs the objects of its control and stipulates
their normative relationships, it simultaneously establishes "the Cherokee
Nation" as an offended sovereign, whose authority opposes lawbreakers
per se, regardless of race or gender, and whose "stripes" produce, in Fou-
cault's terms, "the effect, in the rites of punishment, of a certain
mechanism of power: of a power that not only did not hesitate to exert
itself directly on bodies, but was exalted and strengthened by its visible
manifestations."
197
The elimination of licit marriages between "negro slaves" on the
one hand, and "Indians" or "Whites" on the other, focuses on slave-status:
the 1827 Constitution "permitted citizenship, albeit with restrictions, for
descendants of Cherokee women and free [B]lack men.0 98 If the 1827
Constitution can be said to look backwards, to the older clan system, in this
recognition of citizenship, the action of the Council in 1825, to grant citi-
zenship to the children of Cherokee men married to White women,
lookedforward, to the nation-model of citizenship: "The Cherokee Coun-
cil extended citizenship to 'the children of Cherokee men and [W]hite
women living in the Cherokee Nation as man and wife' and made them
'entitled to all the immunities and privileges enjoyed by citizens descend-
ing from the Cherokee race, by the mother's side. ,,99 As Yarbrough
summarizes, "Cherokee men could now create Cherokee citizens.' 2 °
Following the Removal Act of 1830, the pressure of the federal gov-
ernment and the State of Georgia, its militia, and lawless White settlers to
obtain Cherokee land became overwhelming, and in 1835, an unauthor-
ized group of Cherokees, a minority of citizens known as the Treaty Party,
and the United States entered into the Treaty of New Echota for the sale
of all remaining Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi. Leaders of the
Treaty Party, an elite group of some of the wealthiest plantation owners,
196. On "docile bodies" as the objects of disciplinary systems peculiar to the modern
age, see MICHEL FoucAuLT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:THE BIRTH OF THE PRIsoN 136 (Vintage
Books 1977) ("A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved.").
197. Id. at 57. Other laws passed by the Cherokee Council prior to Removal reflect
similar attempts to objectify African descendants by denying them the liberties enjoyed by
Euroamericans: "no contract or bargain entered into with any slave or slaves without the
approbation of their masters shall be binding...." (1819); "no one may purchase any item
of property from a slave without permission from his owner" (1820); "no slave shall be
allowed to sell or buy spiritous liquor" (1820). McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 381.
198. Yarbrough, supra note 184, at 389.
199. Id. at 388.
200. Id. at 389.
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and their slaves immediately decamped for Indian Territory.20' Though
both the leadership of the Treaty Party and the majority political body, the
National Party, owned slaves, the remaining Cherokees, who were more
culturally conservative, now "associated slavery with the [W]hite south-
erners who had forced them from their homes and with the slaveholding
Cherokees who had signed the fraudulent treaty."20 2 Attempts by Principal
Chief Ross to retain their land base failed, and in the winter of 1838-39,
at the bayonet-point of thousands of federal troops, approximately 16,000
Cherokee citizens and their slaves embarked for Indian Territory (present
day northeastern Oklahoma) on what became known to Cherokees as
Nunna daul Isunyi, "the trail where we cried."An estimated one-quarter of
the tribe and an unknown number of slaves perished on route.
The trauma of their forced march, displacement from ancestral lands,
anger at their betrayal by fellow Cherokees, and ardent desire to survive as
a nation led almost immediately to two defining political events: the con-
frontation and killing of most of the leaders of the Treaty Party and the
signing of the 1839 Constitution. In these large gestures of sovereignty,
the Cherokee Nation symbolically witnessed the end of one phase of its
political life and announced the start of another. 2 03 When, in a ceremony
in 1846, Principal Chief Ross finally accepted the Treaty of New Echota
as a fait accomplice, he shook hands with his arch enemy, Stand Watie, the
sole surviving leader of the Treaty Party, and deftly acknowledged the bio-
logical and nationalistic fiindaments of their bond, saying, "We are all of
201. ANGIE DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 124 (Univ. of
Okla. Press 1970). In 1808, a contingent of some 1130 Cherokees, known as the "Chero-
kees West" or "Old Settlers," migrated west of the Mississippi. WOODWARD, supra note 137,
at 131. Some 2,000 Cherokees joined the Old Settlers between 1836-38 in what is today
eastern Oklahoma. Id. at 195. The promulgation of the Constitution of 1839 is significant
to the Cherokee Nation today in part because it represents the political reunification of
the Old Settlers (captioned the "Western Cherokees" in the Preamble) and the majority
National Party ("Eastern Cherokees") under a single government: "The Eastern and West-
ern Cherokees having again re-united, and become one body politic, under the style and
title of the Cherokee Nation .... " STARR, supra note 110, at 122.
202. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 68.
203. While Chief Ross and the Cherokee government were not implicated in the
assassinations of the Nation's political enemies, the killings "by a group of Cherokees"
were performed "in accordance with the law of 1829 which had made the cession of
Cherokee land a capital offense." Id. at 73 (describing the deceased as "executed"). Treaty
Party leader John Ridge had stated, immediately after signing the traitorous Treaty of New
Echota, "I feel as if I had just signed my own death warrant." CONLEY, supra note 58, at
143. No one was ever charged in connection with the deaths, because contemporaneous
with the signing of the Constitution, the Cherokee National Convention made a blanket
grant of pardon and amnesty to "all persons, citizens of the eastern and western Cherokee
nation, who may be chargeable with the act of murder or homicide .... " STAR, supra note
110, at 119.The legal predicate of the killings in Cherokee law, known to all, the attendant
political circumstances, and the grant of pardon and amnesty, make the deaths symbolic of
an act of sovereignty, even if the killings were performed by individuals not acting under
color of Cherokee law.
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the household of the Cherokee family and of one blood ... embracing
each other as Countrymen, friends, and relatives."
20 4
In the years preceding the Civil War, the Cherokee Nation enacted
increasingly severe slave codes. These codes re-entrenched the position of
the "mixed-blood" elite who once again owned the majority of slaves,
operated plantations (albeit on a smaller scale), and sought to control the
Nation's blood-based political and social identities. Slave rebellions in
1841, 1842, and 1850205 prompted enactment of even harsher penalties on
disobedient slaves and those would assist them in emulating the lifestyle of
the Nation's citizens. From 1841 to 1859, the following laws were passed
by the Council (as summarized by McLoughlin):
1841-[N]o slave shall be allowed to carry firearms, knives,
dirks, or other dangerous weapons
1842-[A]ny free negro or slave aiding another slave to run
away shall receive 100 lashes and be removed from the
Cherokee Nation
1848-[A]nyone teaching a negro to read or write shall be
banished from the Cherokee Nation
1855-[N]o public school teacher "suspected of entertaining
sentiments favorable to abolitionism" shall be allowed in
the Nation
1859-[A]ll free [B]lacks in the Nation shall be required to
leave (this bill though passed by both houses of the
Cherokee legislature was vetoed by the chief). 2 6
As McLoughlin observes, "it can be shown very easily that the status
of [B]lack slaves and [B]lack freedmen among the Cherokees declined
steadily over the years. Accepting the standards of neighboring [W]hite
civilization, the Cherokees gradually adopted all the worst features of
Southern [B]lack slave codes (including the mounted, armed patrols to
enforce them) : Yarbrough states:
[T]hroughout the nineteenth century, Cherokee authorities
sharpened the line between Indians and people of African de-
scent. The Nation also more closely aligned itself with the
[W]hite race and adopted a racial ideology that focused on the
difference between [B]lack and non-[B]lack instead of [W]hite
and non-[W]hite. That is, whereas American society defined its
members in terms that distinguished between those who were
204. Sruuv, supra note 67, at 66.
205. McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 381.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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[W]hite and everyone else, the Cherokees chose to focus on
the similarities among all non-[B]lack peoples, making the dis-
tinction between those who were [B]lack and everyone else.
This new racial identification was a great ideological shift for
Cherokees who had seen themselves as not only distinct from
[W]hites, but distinct from other Indian tribes as well.20 8
Expanding but also fundamentally revising the antimiscegenation
law of 1824, the first law that the Council passed after Removal, on Sep-
tember 19, 1839, was entitled, "An Act to Prevent Amalgamation with
Colored Persons," which specified more repressive restrictions on inter-
marriage, including the prohibition of intermarriage "between a free male
or female citizen with any slave or person of color."20 9 Significantly, where
the 1824 law penalized White or Indian intermarriage with slaves, the
post-Removal law, while retaining this prohibition, conceived the crime
as one of Cherokee citizens' "amalgamation with colored persons." Thus,
the first act of the new Cherokee government was to impose as a civic
obligation the avoidance of inter-racial marriage when the citizen's partner
was other than White or Cherokee. By statutory implication, to be a "pure
blood" Cherokee was not to be a "person of color" and to be a good
Cherokee citizen was to marry within racial boundaries (that is to say, to
marry a White or another Cherokee). Further, to underscore the gravity
of this racial-civic injunction, the penalty for violating the new statute
was "fifty stripes for convicted females of both races and a hundred lashes
for [B]lack males whereas the [pre-Removal laws] had punished [B]lack
and Cherokee males equally but more severely than females. 210
Yarbrough argues that the anti-amalgamation law "may have re-
flected a larger legal effort to protect the racial purity of the Cherokee
Nation" by deterring men of African descent from forming intimate un-
ions with Cherokee women, or by creating an incentive for Cherokee
women to seek out Cherokee men. 1 Sturm echoes this theme in the
context of citizenship criteria, when she observes that "[b]y excluding
African Americans from the body politic, the Cherokee state was repro-
ducing nineteenth-century Euroamerican racial ideologies in its own
208. Yarbrough, supra note 184, at 389.
209. PERDuE, supra note 77, at 84.
210. Id.
211. Yarbrough, supra note 184, at 393. Cherokee legislation in the 1840s and 1850s
also made it increasingly difficult for White men to marry Cherokee women. The legal
obstacles, involving a license application, a petition to the Council, testimonials of charac-
ter from Cherokees, a significant fee, and, finally, an oath of allegiance of the Cherokee
Nation, may have been promoted more by a desire to police national boundaries against
dangerous White males than by a desire for racial purity. No corresponding obstacles ex-
isted for White women wishing to marry Cherokee men. Nonetheless, the laws had the
effect, for Cherokee women, of concentrating the pool of easily-available suitors to
Cherokee males. See id. at 398-400.
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legislation, including the idea that national identity was linked to racial
identity and the notion that 'race-mixing' with African Americans was
polluting. 212 In 1840 the Cherokees went even further, to make it unlaw-
ful for "any free negro or mulatto, not of Cherokee blood, to hold or own
any improvements within the limits of this Nation.' 213 As Sturm explains,
"The wording of this legislation is significant because it marks the first
time when Cherokees officially began to conflate ideas of race and blood
in their own political discourse and practices. 21 4 Finally, historian Karen
Woods writes that "[t]he regulation of'tribal blood' through miscegena-
tion laws was part of a policy to keep Cherokee property in the hands of
Cherokee citizens and to protect sovereignty through the preservation of
'Indian-ness.' ,,215
In summary, the rise of the Cherokee Nation effected a displace-
ment of the traditional clan system, and with it, the exclusive right of
Cherokee women to define, by their bodies, who would become mem-
bers of the tribe. As my review of Cherokee law has shown, however, the
construction of Cherokee identity along lines of race did not abandon
biology when it assumed the form of nation. Rather, Cherokee law, as
represented in its Constitution of 1827, Constitution of 1839, slave codes,
and other acts of the legislature established Cherokee citizenship criteria
as the elaboration of possibilities inherent in biological lineage, opening
up the strictly matrilineal system to allow Cherokee men to generate new
citizens through exogamy. The commitment of the Nation's mixed-blood
elite to the economic system of plantation slavery, however, presented
dangerous opportunities for class-transgressions with slaves and miscege-
nation with [B]lacks, free or slave. In response, the Nation devoted
considerable energy and attention to constructing and policing racial
boundaries for the good of the Nation and, by 1840, for the purity of
"Cherokee blood" Indeed, by then, they were one and the same.1 6
4.The Limits of Biological Definitions of Citizenship
The utility of "Cherokee blood" as a marker for citizenship is lim-
ited by the inaccuracy of the Dawes Rolls and by the Rolls' reliance on
212. STuRm, supra note 67, at 70-71.
213. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
214. Id.
215. Karen M. Woods, A "Wicked and Mischievous Connection": The Origins of Indian-
White Miscegenation Law, 23 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 37, 68 (1999).
216. Legal scholar Ariela Gross writes, "For Native Americans [in the early nine-
teenth century], the conflation of'race' and 'nation' offered some hope of avoiding being
lumped together with African Americans as 'people of color: "Ariela Gross, Beyond Black
and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640,681 (2001).
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nineteenth-century race science. The Rolls' inaccuracy is especially evi-
dent in three areas.
First, though purporting to separately identify Cherokees by blood
and Freedmen, many on the Freedmen's roll descended from persons with
"Indian blood." Despite the best efforts of the Nation's laws to prevent
miscegenation, persons of African and Cherokee descents did marry and
have children: the 1835 census reveals a small percentage of self-identified
"Mixed 'Negro"' Cherokees in North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and
217Tennessee. Following Removal, missionaries "reported that intermarriage
continued and [antimiscegenation] laws were not enforced."2 " Historian
Tiya Miles summarizes the matter, stating, "Interracial marriage in the slave
quarters and in free communities of color meant that the Black population
and the Indian population were overlapping and expanding and that the
slave population included more and more persons of Black and Native de-
scent " '2' 9 This does not even take into account the descendants of persons
born outside of marriage, perhaps as slaves, whose parents were of African
and Cherokee descent.220 Indeed, in an anthropological study conducted
between 1926 and 1928, more than 25 percent of the African American
population reported having Native American ancestry.221
Yet, the Freedmen's roll systematically excluded evidence of Native
American ancestry, and agents refused to record it, even when proffers of
proof of "Indian blood" were made by enrollees themselves. For example,
Mary Walker, a woman of African-Cherokee heritage, attempted to enroll
as a Cherokee citizen "by blood," after reciting her Cherokee ancestry to
an agent of the Dawes Commission. She was refused by a second agent
present, who insisted she be enrolled as a Freedman's descendant, saying,
"She ain't no Cherokee. She's a nigger. That woman is a nigger and you
are going to put her down as a nigger.' 222 If not excluding enrollees from
the "blood" rolls based on their appearance alone, Dawes agents channeled
217. Percentage of Cherokee "Mixed 'Negro' " population by state (1835): North
Carolina (0.5), Georgia (0.01),Alabama (0.3),Tennessee (1.2). THORNTON, supra note 50, at
53.
218. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 85.
219. Miles, supra note 120, at 145.
220. On the history of the use of African-descended women's bodies by their Native
American slave masters, see Miles, supra note 120, at 149-53.When the Cherokee Council
passed a rape law in 1839, it mandated the death penalty for the rape of a free woman
"lacking negro blood," regardless of the race of the perpetrator; however, "the statute is
maddeningly silent" on whether the Nation even recognized the crime of rape of a Black
woman, free or slave. SeeYarbrough, supra note 184, at 393; see also SCOTT L. MALcoMSON,
ONE DROP OF BLOOD: UTE AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE 98 (Farrar Straus Giroux
2000) ("Out-of-wedlock mixed-race children [i.e., African-Cherokee] were not uncom-
mon.").
221. Miles, supra note 120, at 144 (citing MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, THE AMERICAN NE-
GRO:A STUDY OF RACE CROSSING (1928)).
222. STURM, supra note 67, at 189.
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enrollees like Mary Walker onto the Freedmen's roll by applying the rule
of hypodescent, the so-called "one drop" rule, devised by Euroamerican
slave owners, whereby "a person who has one drop of Black blood is
Black, 223 and therefore ineligible for inclusion on the Cherokee "blood"
rolls.224 Because the Freedmen's roll systematically omits proof of Chero-
kee ancestry where such ancestry could be established by independent
evidence, and because there is no other Dawes roll on which such ances-
try can appear, the Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot
serve as an accurate resource for identifying all Cherokees by "blood.,
22
5
Second, the Dawes Rolls elided the Cherokee ancestry of African-
descended persons by accepting only proof of Cherokee "blood" through
the applicant's mother.226 Although, as we have seen, the Anti-
Amalgamation Act penalized intermarriage of both male and female
Cherokee citizens with "persons of color," and imposed capital punish-
ment for the rape of Cherokee women by men of any race, it is unknown,
as historian Yarbrough states, whether Cherokee statutory law even penal-
223. Miles, supra note 120, at 147. On the presumptions ofWhite "blood" superiority
that underpin the rule of hypodescent, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 26 (1991) ("[H]ypodescent imposes racial subordination
through its implied validation of [W]hite racial purity."). For a response to Gotanda which
argues for "a more balanced view of the one drop rule" in the context of multiracial classi-
fications by the U.S. Census, see Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule:
Racial Categories, African Americans, and the US. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1166
(1997).
224. At the same time, Dawes agents confronted with persons of Euroamerican-
Cherokee ancestry systematically included them on the Cherokee by blood rolls. This selec-
tive use of hypodescent illustrates that the method operated within a larger hierarchy of
races and "bloods." Some Freedmen or descendants sued to establish their Native Ameri-
can heritage according to biology, but were consistently rebuffed by the courts, who ruled
that "the Dawes Conunission was a quasi-judicial tribunal and that its findings concerning
the amount of blood or the existence of Indian blood could not be attacked by outside
evidence." Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REv. 1, 43 (2006).
225. As legal scholar Carla Pratt states, regarding the enrollment of the Seminoles,
"The creation of the Blood Roll as the official record of all Indians generated the false
cultural belief within the tribe, the federal government, and American society that all of
the 'real' Indians were named on the Blood Roll, and the people on the Freedmen Roll
were 'just [B]lack.' " Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf: The Role of Race in Constructing Na-
tive American Identity, 35 SEroCN HALL L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2005).
226. See DEBO, supra note 91, at 42.
[A]pparently at the time of the enrolment the Dawes Commission regularly
enrolled all with apparent Negro blood as freedmen. If any of them had In-
dian blood they were not recognized as Indians by tribal law, for there was
no way by which a valid marriage could be contracted. Illegitimate children
of [W]hite fathers and Negro mothers are, of course, uniformly classed as
Negroes by [White Americans, and the Indians had followed the same rule.
A Race or a Nation?
ized sexual intercourse, consensual or non-consensual, between Cherokee
227
men and African-descended women. Given the unequal positions of
power between Cherokee masters and their African slaves, and the disin-
centives created by Cherokee law for intermarriage between [B]lack men
and Cherokee women, or rape of Cherokee women by [B]lack men, it is
reasonable to expect that the typical descendant of otherwise prohibited
interracial unions would be African-descended through the mother's line.
The Dawes registration system, based on its own "amalgamation" of In-
dian blood and matrilineal preference-making, shunted descendants of
Cherokee men and African women onto the Freedmen's roll. Because this
"amalgamation" of race and matrilinearity resulted in reducing the roster
of persons otherwise eligible for inclusion on the Cherokee "blood" rolls,
the Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot serve as an accurate
resource for identifying all Cherokees by "blood."
Third, biology is limited in its ability to establish citizenship when
otherwise-eligible persons choose not to participate in the legal process
by which biology-based citizenship is established. When the Dawes
Commission came to enroll tribal members, many culturally conservative
Cherokees refused to participate, on the grounds that land severance vio-
lated basic principles of Cherokee society. These Cherokees, like similar-
minded members of other tribes in Indian Territory, saw clearly that the
break-up of their tribal land base was just the first step in a larger federal
project to destroy their indigenous cultures. Called "irreconcilables," and
often associated with "full-bloodedness" these tribal members adopted in-
dividual and coordinated strategies to discourage other Cherokees from
enrolling, and to try to avoid the federal agents sent to seek them out.
228
However, as Garroutte points out, "the descendants of those traditionalists
find themselves worse off, in the modern, legal context, for their for-
bearers' success in the fight to maintain cultural integrity. By the criteria
their tribes have established, they can never become enrolled citizens."
229
The plight of the "irreconcilables" shows that biology is a problematic
predicate for Cherokee citizenship when the legal regime establishing
citizenship faces a legitimacy-crisis in the eyes of a significant number of
biologically-eligible Cherokees. The story of the "irreconcilables" also
indicates that biology-based citizenship requirements were problematic
227. See Yarbrough, supra note 184, at 393. See also Miles, supra note 120; MALCOM-
SON, supra note 220.
228. See DEBO, supra note 91, at 54 ("With the Indian genius for collective action,
the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw irreconcilables formed the Four Mothers
Society, said at one time to have twenty-four thousand members."); id. at 57 ("When they
refused to register their choice, the Dawes Commission made the selection for them ...
but the Indians refused to accept the selections, and when the certificates and patents were
mailed to them, they returned them."); id. at 98 ("The fullblood Cherokees were brought
from the remote hill settlements and guided through the land office by the real estate
speculators in the same manner as the Choctaws.").
229. GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 22.
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not only to the Freedmen, but to a wider social constituency of the Na-
tion. To the extent that biological Cherokees refused to grant legitimacy
to the Dawes Rolls by participating in enrollment, the Rolls are incom-
plete and therefore cannot serve as an accurate resource for identifying all
Cherokees by "blood."
The problems of hypodescent, race-matrilinearity, and social legiti-
macy identified above point to a more fundamental limitation on using
biology to establish Cherokee citizenship. The Dawes Rolls' taxonomy of
possible Cherokee citizens is flawed because it rests upon the "long-
discredited belief that each race [has] its own blood type, which [is] corre-
lated with physical appearance.... ,230 It is quite likely that the Dawes
agents who denied Mary Walker enrollment on the "blood" rolls would
have agreed with the postulate of nineteenth-century race science that
"blood will tell."
The roots of race science can be traced to Samuel Morton, the
American scientist whose work from 1831 to 1851 rejected monogenesis
and the biblically-inspired single-origin theory of "the races" in favor of a
polygenetic theory of multiple human origins in multiple races, which
was still, however, based in Christian scripture.2 3 1 Morton ranked "the
races" in terms of intelligence and cultural superiority based on various
features (circumference, volume) of their skulls. Morton's conclusions,
which placed Caucasians at the top of the hierarchy, consigned members
of the "colored races"-including both Indians and Blacks-to the lower
ranks, and squared neatly with the racist ideology of southern planters,
who welcomed Morton's work. On his death in 1851, a leading scientific
journal praised him, saying, "We of the South should consider him as our
benefactor, for aiding most materially in giving to the negro his true posi-
tion as an inferior race.
'23
1
Morton was succeeded by Lewis Henry Morgan, whose Darwin-
inspired theories of social evolution would prove highly influential in the
period when the Dawes Rolls were constructed. Morgan predicted the
imminent extinction of Native Americans as being biologically weaker and
frailer than their White competitors, "the fittest," who would "survive"
them.233 The notion that "races" compete for survival, and fare better or
worse based in part on their intrinsic qualities, readily tracked the racist
230. Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46. See also
Steve Russell, The Racial Paradox of Tribal Citizenship, 46 AM. STUDIES 147, 149-57 (2005)
(criticizing race and blood quantum as the basis for Cherokee citizenship and identity).
231. DAVID HLrRST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE
BATTLE FOR NATIV AMERICAN IDENTITY 36-43 (Basic Books 2000); STEPHEN JAY GOULD,
THE MISMEASUR OF MAN 62-104 (W. W Norton & Co. 1996) (1981) ("American Poly-
geny and Craniometry before Darwin: Blacks and Indians as Separate, Inferior Species").
232. THOMAS, supra note 231, at 42.
233. Id. at 44-51, 102-20.
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ideologies of the day and did nothing to disturb either the racial essential-
ism underlying American public policy and popular opinion23 or
anthropologists' rankings of "the races" according to physiognomy. 23 As a
result, "blood" still past from generation to generation, albeit now under
the twin constraints of inter-race competition and its own inherent, bio-
logical limitations.
Progressive social science at the end of the nineteenth century,
therefore, carried forward the Euroamerican racial significations of previ-
ous centuries, but authorized them within a new disciplinary matrix of
federal Indian law and policy. The plan of the federal government to allot
tribal lands to Indians in severalty, despite its often clumsy or corrupt im-
plementation in the field,237 represents the operation of law under the
conditions of race science: both science and "common sense" showed Indi-
ans to be a weak and vanishing race, whose only hope lay in assimilation
and the embrace of private property; and "negroes" to be even less evolved
than Indians and naturally suited only for the subsistence farming that their
allotments would provide. 238 That the biological theories underpinning
234. High fertility rates among recent U.S. immigrants from southern and eastern
Europe during the period 1880 to 1920, and an influx of Irish immigrants, created great
distress among "native born" Americans, who articulated their fears in terms of race and
decried the "suicide of race." See Barry Edmonston & Jeffirey S. Passel, How Immigration and
Intermarriage Affect the Racial and Ethnic Composition of the US. Population, in IMMIGRATION
AND OPPORTUNITY: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 373,374
(Frank D. Bean & Stephanie Bell-Rose eds., Russell Sage Foundation 1999). See also L.
Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702,
752 n.329 (2001).
235. "Although Morton's belief in separate racial creations was largely forgotten after
the Civil War, the almost obsessive urge to classify human skulls into fixed, unchanging
races or hereditary 'types' continued undiminished. During this period ... mainstream
anthropology was still dividing humanity into a fixed number of races ...." THoMAs, supra
note 231, at 103.
236. See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century
Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1940 (2000) ("By the late nineteenth century, the con-
nection between [W]hiteness and the ability to be part of the American body politic had
been underscored by race scientists, some working from the humanist traditions of history
and philosophy, and others working in the new fields of natural history opened up by
Charles Darwin and others.").
237. See Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question
at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 280 (2001) (stating that
Dawes Rolls' "blood quantum determinations were carelessly performed and routinely
inaccurate.").
238. The "common sense" that accepted the rule of hypodescent in early twentieth
century America, for example, is reflected in views on the intelligence of persons of Afri-
can-European ancestry. As historian Murray Wickett reports, "[Mlost [W]hites did believe
that they [Black-White persons] were more intelligent than pure [B]lacks. One [Oklahoma]
settler referred to a mulatto family that lived close by as 'clean colored folks, you know, they
wasn't ... real dark. They ... weren't niggers you know. Just mulattos." MURRAY R. WicKErT,
CONTESTED TERRITORY: WHITEs, NATIVE AMIuwCANS AND AFRIcAN AMERICANS IN OKLAHOMA,
1865-1907 40 (La. State Univ. Press 2000). See also Michael A. Elliott, Telling the Difference:
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these social policies and their racist ideologies are utterly false is now vir-
tually beyond challenge.2 As Garroutte states:
A final concern [with] biological definitions of [Native Ameri-
can] identity is their inextricable entanglement with the
notion of race. Biological definitions promote the notion that
"race" constitutes an objective, genetically based difference be-
tween groups of people. Most Americans accept this
assumption, unaware that it runs contrary to most current sci-
entific knowledge, which tends to view racial distinctions as
significant social, but not biological, realities.240
Consequently, the wisdom of employing the Dawes Rolls as a de-
terminant of Native American identity must be questioned; especially,
though not only, the use of those rolls which claim to denote "Indians by
blood" They should be questioned not because they are inaccurate indi-
cators of Native American ancestry for those listed (though they may be
that as well),241 but because they recapitulate a system of race hierarchies
based on bogus science.
Nineteenth-Century Legal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 611, 617
("[L]aws that defined race through biological ancestry became more common only after
Reconstruction, and the fraction of 'blood' requisite for African American identity most
often decreased after the turn of the twentieth century.").
239. In the following quotation from legal scholar Scott Gould, "the Dawes Rolls"
may be substituted for "the census" to the same effect:
[C]onsiderable doubt exists whether race can even be quantified scientifi-
cally. Prior to the science of genetics, racial characteristics were believed to
be inherited by blood, hence the preoccupation with blood quanta in the
census. References to Indians as "full-bloods" and "mixed bloods" in the
nineteenth century (and persisting into the twenty-first) stem from this mis-
conception. Racial divisions based on genes are also proving to be
unreliable.... Indeed, the recently completed mapping of the human ge-
nome suggests that humans and their nearest primate relatives, the
chimpanzees, may share an almost identical set of genes. There is no taxo-
nomic basis in biology or physiology to support the racial distinctions used
by the U.S. Census.
Gould, supra note 234, at 754-55. See also Wright, supra note 230 ("Whatever the word
'race' may mean elsewhere in the world, or to the world of science, it is clear that in
America the categories are arbitrary, confused, and hopelessly intermingled.").
240. GARRourrTE, supra note 48, at 58.
241. See id. at 24 (discussing the phenomenon of "five-dollar Indians"-White
homesteaders who bribed Dawes agents to be listed on the blood rolls).
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D. From Biology to Ancestry, From Legal Fetishism to Law
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that a tribal citizenship system,
like that of the Cherokee Nation, which relies exclusively on the Dawes
Rolls, necessarily authorizes membership determinations based on nine-
teenth-century categories of race.2 42 The system does so not because of
the personal animus of present-day tribal leaders or registration officials
toward persons of color.143 The Dawes Rolls reflect in very specific ways,
however, the effects of race hierarchies (and normative assumptions of
gender, legitimacy, property, and law) which are reproduced anew each
time the Nation processes an application of tribal citizenship and each
time the federal government does, or does not, issue a Certificate of De-
gree of Indian Blood. For the Cherokee Nation, and perhaps for other
Indian nations who look to the Dawes Rolls for citizenship criteria, what
seems to be required is no less than the rescue of ancestry firom biology.2
By "biology," I mean the social construction of racial identities upon
heredity, as demonstrated in the history of Cherokee self-identity and
Cherokee citizenship requirements in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. If Cherokee national identity is to escape its continued
construction upon the effects of a spurious race science, Cherokees must
be attentive to their "official" genealogy's structural and historical affilia-
tion with that false god, and re-imagine criteria of citizenship based not
on "Indian blood" but on new, non-racialized understandings of and ap-
preciation for Cherokee ancestry.2 4 5
242. "Southern historians should not be surprised that the concern with 'blood' that
Indians throughout the nation now share originated in the antebellum South where the
economic, social, and political system rested on the enslavement of one race by another.
The legacy of slavery was a regional obsession with race as a signifier of power." PERDUE,
supra note 121,at 98.
243. Nonetheless, Cherokee people, like others in the United States, are not immune
to color bias. Sturm's interviews with individual Cherokees identified "a long-held Chero-
kee bias against dark skin" and a bias toward light-skinned persons. STURM, supra note 67, at
189-90. One of her informants, speaking in the late 1990s, said, "Cherokees have always
prided themselves in being a light-skinned people." Id. at 190. Sturm comments on this
statement, saying, "A Cherokee bias against dark skin, the result of their adaptation of a
system of African racial slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, provides the
simplest and more direct explanation for their social treatment and racial classification of
multiracial individuals with [B]Iack ancestry even today." Id.
244. On the distinction of race and ancestry in Native American tribes as it pertains to
federal protections against race-based discrimination under the Fifteenth Amendment, see
Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, but Because of Ea: Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495
(2000), 24 HARv.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 921, 950 (2001) ("The [concurring Justices'] fixation on
race is ill-founded when dealing with the political status of Indian tribal membership. The
color of one's skin is not the determining factor for tribal membership; it is one's ancestry.
For Indian tribes, ancestry need not be a proxy for race.").
245. See Joyce A. McCray Pearson, Red and Black-A Divided Seminole Nation: Davis v.
US., 14 KAN.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 607,630 (2005) ("Yes, ancestry is important. But when the
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But Cherokees must also rescue law from legalism-an attachment
to the authority of the Dawes Rolls that borders on fetishism. 46 The
power of the Dawes Rolls over Cherokee political identity is evident in
the citizenship provisions of the 1976 Constitution,247 the 1999 Constitu-
• 248 • • 249
tlon, the opinion of the Lucy Allen majority, and in the following
statement by Chief Smith, defending the race-impartiality of Cherokee
citizenship criteria:
truth about ancestry is obscured by man-made constructs and rules that divide people
purely along racial lines and the way they look, as in the case of the Dawes [R]olls, it is
imperative that we take time to try and undo those wrongs.");John Rockwell Snowden,
Wayne Tyndall & David Smith, American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It's a Race
Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 236 (2001) (calling on tribes to reject race-based citizenship
criteria); Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native American History, Law
and Culture: The Harry Batchelor Address, 13 ST.THoMAS L. REV. 11, 15 (2000) (on the irra-
tional and culturally destructive effects of the Dawes Rolls today).
246. On the idea of "legal fetishism" as a regard for legal regimes such as the Dawes
Rolls which fails to give sufficient attention to the role of the subject in producing, inter-
preting, or organizing those regimes, see Anthony Paul Farley, The Apogee of the Commodity,
53 DEPAut L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2004) ("We have been trained to see, and do in fact see,
the rules as if they determine the circumstances of their own application. This is legal fet-
ishism."). Farley understands Euroamerican law in North America since the seventeenth
century as devoted to the commodification of Blacks by Whites:
[A] fetish is an artifact that is treated as if it were not the product of human
work.... Law, looked upon as if it were something other than the force of the
system of marks and the system of property, is a fetish. Law, looked upon as if
it were something other than [W]hite-over-[B]lack, is a fetish. Law is
[W]hite-over-[B]lack, [W]hite-over-[B]lack only, and that continually.
Id. at 1236. See also Jack M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and
the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 108-109 (1993) ("When jurisprudential
discussions neglect what the legal subject brings to the object of interpretation, they pro-
ject the subject's contribution onto the object, thereby manifesting this contribution as a
feature or property of law.").
247. CONST. OF THE CHEROKE NATION art. III, 5 1 (1976) ("All members of the
Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls
.... .).
248. CoNsT. OF THE CHERoKE NATION art. IV, § 1 (1999) ("All citizens of the Chero-
kee Nation must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on the
Dawes Commission Rolls.
249. "[T]he 1975 Constitution affirms these rights by linking citizenship to one
single document: the Dawes Rolls." Lucy Allen, JAT-04-09 at 4. The Lucy Allen majority
affirms the importance of Cherokee ancestry (which it calls "blood") while challenging
the legal hegemony that the Dawes Rolls exercises over Cherokee citizenship, stating, "It is
not clear that the Dawes Commission had any appreciation for the fact that Indian blood,
of the various tribes, is different. Shawnee blood is not Cherokee blood. Delaware blood is
not Cherokee blood. It is important for this Court to question whether all these federal
blood degrees really matter today, for purposes of Cherokee citizenship laws." Id. at 8-9.
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[T]he other thing that is clear is that the Cherokee Nation
Constitution is not based on race. People of many different
ethnic backgrounds, African Americans, [W]hite Americans
and Hispanic Americans, have Cherokee ancestors on the Dawes
Roll; and they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee Nation
citizenship. However, someone will undoubtedly play the race
card in this debate.5 0
The attachment of Cherokee law to the Dawes Rolls is reminiscent
of the authority attached to another artifact of colonialism, the Bible
("the English book"), when it was introduced to the people of India, as
presented by postcolonial theorist, Homi Bhabha:
[T]he discovery of the book is, at once, a moment of original-
ity and authority. It is, as well, a process of displacement that,
paradoxically, makes the presence of the book wondrous to the
extent it is repeated, translated, misread, displaced ... [T]he
emblem of the English book-'signs taken for wonders'-[is]
an insignia of colonial authority and a signifier of colonial de-
sire and discipline.51
The Dawes Rolls, too, are such an "insignia" of colonial authority
(over Native Americans), desire (for land), and discipline (of Indians "by
blood' and the "adopted" peoples: "Freedmen," "Intermarried Whites" and
"adopted" Shawnee and Delaware). Like the enunciation of "the English
book," the action of Congress to close the rolls of the Cherokee Nation as
of March 4, 1907252 was a moment of "originality and authority" for the
tribe, and, with each new member created, each Freedmen lawsuit, each
struggle over the right to set citizenship criteria, the authority of the
Dawes Rolls has grown ever more "wondrous.
2 53
In place of this legal fetishism of the Dawes Rolls, which alienates
Cherokees from their sovereign power of self-determination, I believe the
Cherokee Nation should begin to consider alternative criteria for estab-
lishing national citizenship.2 4 In short, I believe Cherokees must reclaim
250. Freedmen Statement, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
251. HOMI BHABHA,THE LoCATION OF CuLTuRE 145-46 (Routledge 1994).
252. The rolls of the Cherokee Nation were closed by Act of Congress, April 26,
1906.34 Stat. 137, 59th Cong. (1906). After 1907, "some duplications were ... canceled,
and 312 names were added by act of Congress in 1914." DEBO, supra note 91, at 47.
253. See Mark Neath, American Indian Gaming Enterprises and Tribal Membership: Race,
Exclusivity, and a Perilous Future, 2 U. Cm. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 689, 696 (1995) ("[Tlhat
federal practices that were designed to assimilate the Indian population employed blood
quantum as the measure of Indian identity suggests a deep irony in tribal acceptance of
similar blood quantum requirements.").
254. The irony that the displaced tribes of Oklahoma, who lost much of their land
bases through allotment based on the method of"blood quantum," would fixate on "blood
quantum" as an indicia of citizenship in their own nations is not lost on Perdue, who
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ancestry from biology and articulate a new political relationship to their
individual and collective pasts, one which does not use law to deploy
categories based on colonialist racial ideologies to exclude potential citi-
zens.
To decide the question of the Freedmen's descendants' status, I sug-
gest, Cherokees by "blood" and the Freedmen's descendants should
engage in a searching dialogue on political and social identity, one that
expressly includes race. In the following part, I will elaborate a version of
the model of Radical Indigenism, articulated by Cherokee sociologist Eva
Garroutte, as one way in which such a dialogue might be conducted, and
explore how it could organize discussion around the Freedmen contro-
versy.
III. RADICAL INDIGENISM AS A RESOURCE FOR RESOLVING
THE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY
A. Foundational Commitments
The model of Radical Indigenism set forth by Garroutte attempts to
offer a way for academics to engage in scholarly research about Native
Americans while respecting the worldviews of the indigenous peoples
they study. 21' As Garroutte explains, "radical" does not intend to connote
either a commitment to Marxist theory or an unnecessarily confronta-
tional stance, but rather a focus on the "root" (radix) of indigenous
knowledge, and its sources in the community and tradition:
[R]adical Indigenism illuminates differences in assumptions
about knowledge that are at the root of the dominant culture's
misunderstanding and subordination of indigenous knowledge.
It argues for the reassertion and rebuilding of traditional
knowledge from its roots, its fundamental principles.5 6
I propose it, and adapt it, as a possible model by which indigenous
communities like the Cherokee Nation, who are struggling to define
their political identities, may do so from within their own assumptions
and methods and not in response to heteronymous criteria.
257
writes, "[A]llotment rolls with their 'blood quantum' became the basis of modern tribal
membership, and in a great historical irony, the language of blood permeates tribal politics
into the twenty-first century." PaDuE, supra note 121, at 98.
255. GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 101-104 (identifying Radical Indigenism and dis-
tinguishing it from both "academic colonialism" and postcolonial theory).
256. Id. at 101.
257. The version of Radical Indigenism that I propose has resonance with the pro-
ject set forth in Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
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Consistent with the above, therefore, a foundational commitment of
the model as I propose it is to the right of federally-recognized tribes to
determine their criteria for citizenship. A corollary of this commitment
is the rejection of the view, expressed by some scholars, that Congress
should exercise its plenary power over Indian tribes, or federal courts
should expand their interpretations of existing statutes, to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity and limit the scope of permissible tribal citizenship
259
criteria.
A second basic commitment of the model is to the rationality of in-
digenous worldviews, "that American Indian (and other indigenous)
philosophies of knowledge are rational, articulable, coherent logics for
ordering and knowing the world" ' 60 Thus, no matter how different from
Euroamerican conceptions of the world an indigenous worldview may
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STArN. L. & POL'Y REv. 191,
196 (2001) ("[Cultural sovereignty is] the effort of Indian nations and Indian people to
exercise their own norms and values in structuring their collective futures"); and id. at 197
("[T]he central challenge of cultural sovereignty is to reach an understanding of sover-
eignty that is generated from within tribal societies and carries a cultural meaning
consistent with those traditions.") (emphasis in original). This Article presumes that tribal
self-governance-political sovereignty-is a necessary condition for robust cultural sover-
eignty, hence my first foundational commitment, see infra notes 258-259 and
accompanying text.
258. The first foundational commitment is my own and does not necessarily reflect
Garroutte's understanding of Radical Indigenism, though I believe it is consistent with the
version of the model she presents in REAL INDIANs.
259. See, e.g., Eric Reitman, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recog-
nized Indian Tribes' Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REv. 793, 863 (2006)
("Bearing in mind the destructive potential of plenary membership power ... Congress
should exercise its power over federally recognized Indian tribes and abrogate, at least in
part, tribal citizenship power."); Williamson, supra note 179, at 262-68 (urging action by
executive agencies, Congress, and courts to protect Freedmen's descendants from "dis-
criminatory tribal policies" by imposing federal equal protection guarantees); Pratt, supra
note 179, at 113-14 (urging action by Congress to grant citizenship to Freedmen's de-
scendants where "self-determination becomes an oppressive tool used to exclude some
Indians on the basis of race.... [W]hen the restriction or limitation on tribal membership
is rooted in notions of racial superiority, it does not serve any legitimate purpose."); Pratt,
supra note 225, at 1260 ("The use of sovereign immunity to protect tribal identity ...
ignores the racist origins of the legal rules that define Indian Seminole identity and serves
to further subjugate people of color, specifically [B]lack Indians, by continuing the en-
forcement of the corrupt rule of hypo-descent."). For arguments rejecting the abrogation
of tribal sovereign immunity and the compromise of the right of tribes to set citizenship
criteria, see Riley, supra note 46 and accompanying text; Goldberg, supra note 113 and
accompanying text. See also Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment,
49 UCLA L. REv. 943, 958-66 (2002) (analyzing arguments that Indian classifications are
political, not social, when they rely on tribal citizenship, not ancestry); Carole Goldberg,
Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1373, 1394 (2002) ("Courts should frankly acknowl-
edge and affirm the kinship- and descent-based nature of tribal communities, recognizing
that the Constitution allows Congress to legislate for communities defined on that basis.").
260. GhaRouTE, supra note 48, at 113.
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be,261 it remains possible in theory to specify that worldview in terms of
tribal or band membership criteria, and in the case of indigenous groups
that are patterned after nations, in terms of citizenship criteria.
A third strong commitment of the model is to the modest role any
one person should play in the articulation of both problems and solutions
affecting one's tribe; in this regard, I echo Garroutte, herself a citizen of
the Cherokee Nation, when she says that "[w]hat follows is not meant as a
prescription for how tribes should think about identity issues; rather, it is a
suggestive exploration of a place from which they might begin to work out
their own definitions of identity with the participation of all their mem-
bers. ' ' 262 This implies a corresponding commitment on the part of
individual tribal members to submit individual notions of citizenship cri-
teria to the test of collective deliberation by the tribe as a whole.
B. Assumptions of the Model
The version of Radical Indigenism that I propose offers three as-
sumptions for guiding dialogue about tribal political identity. The first
two, practicality and spirituality, are derived from Garroutte; the third, re-
flection on the effects of colonialism, is my own.
1. Role of Practical Knowledge
The first assumption of the model emphasizes the practical quality
of the pursuit of knowledge. Knowledge exists first and foremost for the
sake of making a concrete difference in the lived world of tribal members.
This means, as Garroutte states, that the definition of tribal identity must
[B]e robust, allowing for sufficiently strong community
boundaries. But it should be flexible as well, because flexibility
allows for the embrace of those who truly belong to the
community, even if they do not satisfy certain technical criteria
261. For literature on the differences between Euroamerican and Native American
worldviews and spiritual traditions from indigenous perspectives, see, e.g., VINE DELORIA,
GOD Is RED:A NATrVEVIEW OF RELIGION 237-55 (30th anniversary ed. 2003) (examining
impact of contemporary American culture on tribal religions); HUSTON SMITH, A SEAT AT
THE TABLE: HUSTON SMITH IN CONVERSATION WITH NATIVE AMERICANS ON PELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 162-83 (Univ. of Calif. Press 2006) (conversation with Chief Oren Lyons
[Onandaga] on Traditional Instructions of spiritual law); Maureen E. Smith, Crippling the
Spirit, Wounding the Soul: Native American Spiritual and Religious Suppression, in AMERICAN
INDIAN THOUGHT 116-29 (Anne Waters ed., Blackwell Publishing 2004) (overview of Eu-
roamerican and Native American conflicts over religious belief systems and recent shifts in
the law favorable to indigenous peoples' spiritual practices).
262. GARmouTTE, supra note 48, at 113 (emphasis in original).
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of membership. Flexibility allows the community to remain
263
open to the entry of new and valued resources.
Freedmen's descendants, as well as members of the other "adopted"
groups who contribute to the life of the Nation, have a stake as citizens in
constructing membership criteria that are robust: clear, bright-line rules
that establish boundaries between citizens and non-citizens. For the rea-
sons discussed above, the exclusive authority of the Dawes Rolls should
264be abandoned. In dialogue with Cherokees by ancestry, new legal
touchstones could be identified for citizenship. These might include
Cherokee census rolls prepared prior to the Dawes Rolls by Cherokees
themselves;26 rolls in dispute that allegedly include names of Freedmen or
their descendants that were elided by the Dawes Rolls (Wallace Roll,
Kern-Clifton Roll); some combination of these rolls; or rolls plus other
indicia of genealogical connection deemed reliable by the Nation (on
analogy with the "ancient documents" exception to the hearsay rule).266
The aim of this reform is two-fold: to decenter the Dawes Rolls as
the exclusive authority for Cherokee citizenship and subordinate the
Dawes Rolls to a larger genus, determined by the tribe, which might be
called, simply, "reliable records"; and, second, to introduce flexibility into
citizenship criteria by creating a range of authorities through which a
prospective tribal member could attempt to establish citizenship. One can
imagine a default system which privileged a certain set of rolls for citizen-
ship, accompanied by a principled mechanism for vetting special cases,
where those whose ancestors had failed to enroll, or whose enrollment
allegedly had been lost, could attempt to establish ancestral relationship
263. Id. at 115 (emphasis in original).
264. I acknowledge it would be difficult to achieve this decentering. As Carole Gold-
berg has observed, "Once a roll is established as the basis for citizenship, it becomes
politically difficult to expand citizenship beyond its confines." Goldberg, supra note 113, at
458. Nonetheless, the assumption of practicality requires citizenship criteria to be flexible,
as well as bounded, and for that reason I propose the alternatives set forth above.
265. Justice Leeds, writing for the LucyAllen majority, noted that
[Tihe Dawes Commission Rolls were not created by the federal government
from scratch. When the Dawes Commission compiled its rolls, they referred
to previous Cherokee Nation census records which also included a broad
citizenry. Most of the people listed on the Dawes Rolls will also appear on
the Cherokee Nation's own tribally controlled censuses that pre-date the
Dawes Rolls. The Cherokee Nation's own censuses included Freedmen in
addition to 'native Cherokees,' intermarried [W]hites, and Indians of other
tribes, all of whom were recognized by the Cherokee Nation as citizens.
Lucy Allen,JAT-04-09 at 6.
266. The "ancient documents" exception to the hearsay rule as codified in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence allows into evidence probative "[s]tatements in a document in
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established." FED. R. EVID.
803(16).
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with the Nation, perhaps by means of "ancient documents:' This would
respect the role of practical knowledge to establish citizenship criteria that
are both robust and flexible.
2. Relationship to Spiritual Heritage
The second assumption of Radical Indigenism focuses on the "at-
tentiveness" of Native American communities to "the distinctly spiritual
dimensions of inquiry.,267 Garroutte focuses on the sense of many tribes
that they have "a specific spiritual role to play in the world: a particular
place to occupy and a particular task to perform. 2 6s Tribal stories of ori-
gin often embody charges variously called "Original Instructions" or
"First Instructions," which "usually concern coming into relationship
with other beings-human and nonhuman-in the natural world in par-
ticular ways... ,269 Garroutte observes that "[a] definition of identity that
acknowledges this spiritual heritage will recall each tribal community to
its Original Instructions-to its specific teachings about the nature of the
world and how its members are to live in it."2 0 Further, because tribes
routinely interact with non-members, those engaged in dialogue on the
spiritual dimensions of their identity will ask who should be invited "to
join them in their sacred work," that is, who should be asked to share the
burden of executing the Original Instructions that frame their lives.27'
The Cherokee Nation expressly understands itself as performing a
unique and sacred mission in the world. In a document entitled Declara-
tion of Designed Purpose, prepared by the "Chad Smith-Hastings Shade
administration" and dated 2001, the Cherokee Nation elaborates a state-
ment of "vision, mission and guiding principles to lead the Cherokee
Nation for the 21st century."272 Citing the words of early-twentieth cen-
tury Cherokee traditionalist Redbird Smith ("I have always believed that
the Great Creator had a great design for my people, the Cherokees"), the
Declaration lists "Spirit" as the first "guiding principle" for "the decisions
that drive the behaviors, feelings, and attributes necessary" for achieving
desired tribal outcomes. 273 Under "Spirit," the Declaration states, "We be-
267. GARUOU-rTE, supra note 48, at 114 (emphasis in original).
268. Id. at 115.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 115-16.
271. Id. at 116.
272. Declaration of Designed Purpose, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, Fall 2001, http://
www.cherokee.org/Phoenix/XXVno4_Fall2001/ddpl.htm.
273. Id. (The "Desired outcomes" are listed as "Exercise Sovereignty," "Achieve Op-
erational Performance-[by setting] benchmarks ... for each operating team," "Build
Cherokee Nation Employees," "Encourage Tribal Members," and "Use Culture/
Knowledge.").
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lieve that the Creator has a great design for us and acknowledge that
every Cherokee is part of the ever-renewing, ever-expanding, upward
progressive movement of life." 274 The Declaration is consistent with other
official statements of the Nation in acknowledging the significance of
spirituality for Cherokee identity, but not imposing a specific theology,
creed, or set of religious practices as a litmus-test for citizenship.275 Other
Cherokees put it more plainly: in the words of Julie M., a Keetoowah
grandmother interviewed by Garroutte, "We [Cherokees] ... have a special
place in the world. God put us here.,
276
The construction of Cherokee Nation citizenship criteria according
to Radical Indigenism, therefore, would assume the salience of Cherokee
spiritual self-understanding to the dialogue. Whether the Declaration of De-
signed Purpose endures is less important for a dialogue on citizenship than
the legitimacy of religious discourse found among many Cherokee people
as a means of expressing their fundamental orientation in the world. Sturm
points out while "many Cherokees share a common spiritual cosmology,"
the religious beliefs and practices of Oklahoma Cherokee are complex, and
practitioners typically consist of Cherokee Baptists (a variation of Southern
Baptists, inflected by elements of traditional Cherokee culture and religion)
and practitioners of traditional Cherokee religion centered on the Sacred
Fire (the Keetoowah Society).2" Cherokees, whether descendants of
Freedmen, "blood Indians," or others, would be expected to engage in a
conversation where citizenship is understood as more than the negotia-
tion of a social contract, but rather represents the interpretation of sacred
"Original Instructions., 278 Understood as a discussion guided by Chero-
kee assumptions about their place in the world, a conversation on
citizenship would explore whether the Freedmen's descendants have a
civic role to play in the Nation's "designed purpose:' and how that role, if
it exists, might best be performed.
274. Id.
275. Article III, Section 4 of the 1999 Cherokee Constitution provides "[tihe Council
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion .. "The 1999 Constitution in-
cludes no correlate to the Federal Establishment Clause. The Preamble of the 1999
Constitution "acknowledg[es] with humility and gratitude the goodness, aid and guidance of
the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe" in allowing the "People of the Cherokee Nation" to
"preserve our sovereignty, enrich our culture, achieve and maintain a desirable measure of
prosperity and the blessings of freedom." See Comparison of the 1976 and 1999 Constitu-
tions, http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/cccl999Changes.pdf.
276. GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 115 (emphasis in original).
277. STuRM, supra note 67, at 127. See id. at 124-31 (discussing the complexities of
race, religion, and Cherokee identity).
278. In 1996 the Nation reported that approximately 39 percent of its citizens lived
outside Oklahoma. Id. at 11. This large non-resident population poses particular difficulties
for such a dialogue, since one cannot assume a common religious culture among residents
of states as diverse as California and Texas (to name two states where many Cherokees
reside), where Cherokee identity may be predicated on different values.
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3. Effective History of Colonialism
Third, I would add to Garroutte's model the assumption that the so-
cial construction of Native American identities proceeds within a
political, legal, and rhetorical matrix that embodies centuries of Eu-
roamerican domination and indigenous peoples' resistance. 2 79 As a result,
tribal members' constructs of themselves and "others" may consciously or
unconsciously reflect ideologies of race, class, and other divisions, which
implicitly devalue Native Americans themselves and marginalize Native
Americans' access to their own histories and cultures . 80 The assumption of
the effective history281 of colonialism, therefore, also will inform the
model.
The dialogue on Cherokee citizenship would presume the relevance
of Euroamerican history for the Nation, not as a story of Cherokee vic-
timhood or triumphalism, but as a story of colonization cutting across
lines of tribe, race, gender, and economic status. The dialogue would be
difficult and would of necessity include a searching look at how Cherokee
government has been influenced by and at times embraced (in academic
jargon) Euroamerican racial hegemony and ideology. Of necessity, the
dialogue would ask participants to consider the history of the Freedmen,
and explore how their history and that of the Cherokees "by blood" have
intersected under the influence of colonialism, and how that influence
may continue to shape even the dialogue itself.
The three assumptions stated above-practicality, spirituality, and an
effective history of colonialism-may be described as three values for
Cherokee citizenship criteria: a good criterion must serve the practical
function of distinguishing members and non-members while remaining
flexible to changing circumstances; it must respond to an overarching
Cherokee vision of the tribe's purpose in the world; and it must be at-
279. See ROBERT A.WILLIAMS,JR.,THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WEsTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 325-33 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (critical legal history of
Euroamerican engagement with indigenous peoples of the Americas).
280. On the uses and limits of critical social theory for understanding Native Ameri-
can identity politics, see STiuRM, supra note 67, at 19-26. See also Russel Lawrence Barsh,
The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 277,279-91 (1993)
(arguing that American Indians have internalized colonialist values of materialism and
isolationism to the detriment of their traditions).
281. "Effective history" is a concept taken from the work of philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer, and means, in this context, the abiding impact of Euroamerican coloniza-
tion on indigenous peoples and their apprehension of the world. See Francis J. Mootz III,
The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of
Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur 68 B.U. L. REv. 523, 529 (1988) ("understanding is never
subjective behaviour toward a given 'object,' but towards its effective history-the history
of its influence ... ") (quoting HANs-GEoRG GADAMER,TRuTH AND METHOD xix (Eng. trans.
1975)).
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tuned to how the inheritance of colonialism may be at work in the
Nation today. How, then, to. proceed?
C. Critical Hermeneutics ofAncestry and Reciprocity
The point of departure for many tribal communities seeking to un-
derstand themselves, Garroutte, writes, is tradition. "A common assumption
of American Indian knowledge pursuits" she states, "is that the seeker al-
ways looks backward" 282 The bearers of tradition include tribal elders,
whose reflections on tribal identity should be central to the dialogue; oral
and written narratives of the tribe's history, its creation myths, and other
bodies of teachings; and the "records of historic practice and forms of
community life or social structure., 28' By triangulating among elders' state-
ments, oral and written tribal narratives, and community social forms,
testing each body of evidence against the others, tribal members, acting
collectively, can identify traditional tribal principles. With Garroutte, I pro-
pose that a useful principle of identity, which is consonant with the
traditional principles of many tribes, is that of kinship.2 4 Below I will exam-
ine how kinship operates in two modes for determining tribal citizenship:
the relationship to ancestry and the responsibility to reciprocity.
1. Relationship to Ancestry
Legal scholar Angela Riley writes, "Indian tribes reflect the most in-
timate associations in the human experience: they are, by definition,
families. Indian tribes are bound by bloodlines, clan identifiers, and kin-
ship. Ancestry or descent often constitutes the dominant factor in
determining whether one belongs to an Indian tribe."28 1 Carole Goldberg
observes, "biological relationship has always formed some part, often a
significant part, of tribal belonging.'8 6 Garroutte notes that for some Na-
tive Americans, such as author Scott Momaday, the relationship to one's
ancestors can only be expressed as a "memory in the blood," a heritable
"racial memory" that flows from one generation to the next. 87 Rather
than reject such expressions out of hand as fragments of colonialist racial
hegemony, Garroutte finds that when understood in the context of tradi-
tional authorities (elders' statements and sacred stories), claims such as
Momaday's do not exhibit the characteristics of nineteenth-century race
science, but show "a sacred logic to which notions of genealogical distance
282. GARo-rTE, supra note 48, at 117.
283. Id.
284. See id. at 118.
285. Riley, supra note 46, manuscript at 39.
286. Goldberg, supra note 113, at 460.
287. GAIRoTrrTE, supra note 48, at 120.
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and blood quantum are foreign and even irrelevant., 28 Garroutte invites
us to consider the possibility of indigenous (sacred) and non-indigenous
(colonialist) essentialisms, and to embrace the former as legitimate modes
of establishing Native American kinship and thus identity.289
Garroutte's efforts to distinguish race-based notions of ancestral af-
finity such as Momaday's from the racist notions of biological hierarchies
criticized earlier in this Article are intriguing, but would be more persua-
sive, I believe, had she incorporated the third assumption of an effective
history of colonialization. Taken alone, the traditional authorities of elders'
testimony, sacred texts, and community practices are not exempt from the
influences of colonialism:2 90 as Garroutte herself clearly sees, there are no
"pristine" tribal cultural resources to draw on.2 9 ' Therefore, a critical-
historical perspective is needed to prevent the hermeneutic of traditional
principles such as kinship from automatically reproducing and re-
entrenching colonialist ideologies as the basis for citizenship criteria.
Such a critical hermeneutic of tribal tradition would operate within
tribes themselves, to identify and discard-or retain-notions of race,
gender, and other forms of difference that have inflected and formed their
traditional authorities over the course of, perhaps, centuries. An explora-
tion of operative colonialist essentialisms would also create the logical
space within which tribes could identify and discuss examples of kinship
consistent with Garroutte's "indigenous essentialism." The resulting citi-
zenship criteria may not satisfy critics of tribal sovereign immunity, who
288. Id. at 125.
289. See id. at 122-25.
290. Examples of tribal stories of origin or revelation inflected by the race-values of
colonialism are common. See, e.g., McLoughlin, supra note 141, at 378 (describing the
syncretic Shawnee-Christian version of the Garden of Eden story, in which the Great
Spirit (God) visits punishments on his three disobedient children-[W]hite, red, and
[B]lack-appropriate to "an ineradicable hierarchy of races."). See also id. at 373-74 (Se-
neca and Shawnee theological constructs incorporating racial hierarchies). On issues raised
today by the religious syncretism of Christian and indigenous spiritualities, see, e.g., Theresa
S. Smith, The Church of the Immaculate Conception: Inculturation and Identity among the Anish-
naabeg of Manitoulin Island, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITuAtITy: A CRITICAL READER 145-56
(Lee Irwin ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 2000).
291. Garroutte criticizes very effectively the myth of Indian essentialism in GAR-
ROUTTE, supra note 48, at 68-69, referencing the trial of the Mashpees, who failed to
establish sufficient "Indian-ness" to assert a claim for lost ancestral lands. See also JAMES
CLiftoD, Identity in Mashpee, in TH PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 337-38 (1988) (logic of
cultural "authenticity" makes no allowance for "sharp contradictions, mutations, or emer-
gencies" that comprise lived history); GAuouTrrTE, supra note 48, at 136-39 (disavowing
static notions of tradition and defining indigenous traditions as modes of thinking and
acting that correspond to tribes' sacred Original Instructions); see also Gerald Torres &
Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case,
1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 642-49 (Mashpees' story rendered unintelligible and thus legally
irrelevant by dominant culture's history and social practices).
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would utilize extra-tribal criteria to avoid outcomes "anathema in a soci-
ety ruled by laws" 292 (and their own preferences), but the criteria would be
the result of an intra-tribal process where traditional principles, such as
kinship, were generated only after the effective historical consequences of
colonialization had been "named" and debated.
While kinship ties are typically obtained by birth within a tribal
community, they sometimes can be created through adoption. Although
the clan system operated as the primary unit of society, Cherokee "[c]lans
frequently adopted prisoners of war to supplement their own numbers
and to replace kinsmen who had died or been killed' 293 White men in the
late 1700s who associated themselves with Cherokee towns were occa-
sionally, but usually not, adopted by clans.9  In the nineteenth century, as
the clan system was overtaken by the model of citizenship, "American
men who married Cherokee women could then seek legal rights in the
Cherokee Nation without participating in the traditional ritual of adop-
tion.''291 When the Cherokees adopted the Freedmen and their
descendants into the Nation by the Treaty of 1866 and constitutional
amendments of 1866, and later extended citizenship to intermarried
Whites, Shawnee, and Delaware, they did so against a background of
Cherokee adoption practices which, while never extensive or a challenge
to the primacy of descent were nevertheless sufficiently common to have
engendered their own rituals.296
Garroutte argues that the "kinship substance" communicated
through birth may also be ritually transferred through adoption ceremo-
nies. Referring to the rituals of the Iroquois, she states, "[adoptees]
entered the ceremony as one kind of being, and they emerged another.
The kinship substance thus acquired is real and consequential, enabling
new relationships-both social and physical., 297 Examples of Native
American adoption practices, she argues, "challenge the accusation that
essentialist claims are necessarily racist: the essentialisms explored here
292. Reitman, supra note 259, at 804.
293. PERDUE, supra note 77, at 8. Captives who were not killed were either adopted
into clans, or existed as servants in a kind of social limbo outside the clan system. See id. at
3-18 (discussing the social status of such captives, called the atsi nahsa't); see also Goldberg,
supra note 113, at 460 (arguing "tribes may have been more willing to adopt outsiders at a
time when they were less likely to feel threatened that the adoptees' worldview and cul-
ture would overwhelm their own by virtue of material power and sheer numbers" and
"earlier practices of adoption and incorporation may also have been shaped by concerns
for population loss due to warfare and disease that do not preoccupy some tribes today.").
294. McLoUGHLIN, supra note 155, at 31.
295. Yarbrough, supra note 184, at 387.
296. Yarbrough, in her discussion of slavery and citizenship, stresses that "[a]ncestry
was an important component of Cherokee identity and legitimate membership in the
Nation, and the Council passed laws that recognized ancestry and its connection to the
privileges of citizenship." Id. at 395.
297. GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 127.
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have nothing to with the idea of race, a concept rooted in the same
biologistic assumptions that have driven social scientific studies of kin-
ship!'
298
Garroutte's analysis of the traditional principle of kinship leads her
to conclude that ancestry is not the only way that some tribes establish
full-fledged membership. While genealogical relationship remains primary
for most tribes, the possibility exists, "at least in principle, for people of
any race to be brought into kinship relations through the transformative
mechanism of ceremony.' '299 Here again, however, it would seem advisable
to avoid the unreflective application of adoption practices, perhaps devel-
oped for a different age or under the conditions of colonialism, to tribal
•- 300
communities. Ceremonies of transformation (e.g., baptisms and bar
mitzvahs, to choose two common non-indigenous examples) exist to per-
form operative acts on individuals through correct ritual performance:
when properly done, the individual is a substantially different person with
new social rights and obligations.0 ' The model of Radical Indigenism, as I
propose it, assumes the critical assessment of tribal ceremonies of adoption
and the identification of their implicit or express assignment of social, ra-
cial, and gender roles prior to their implementation.
A question that a Cherokee dialogue with the Freedmen's descen-
dants might wish to ask is whether the Nation possesses, or cares to
recover or create, such transformative mechanisms of adoption, and make
them available to the Freedmen's descendants, particularly inasmuch as the
descendants' political identity as citizens appears to hinge on successfully
negotiating their social identity as Cherokee "kin." Claiming political
membership in the polity based on what some regard as a "shot-gun"
treaty and an unpopular judicial decision is no substitute for negotiating
social legitimacy as Cherokees. Without the latter, achieved through diffi-
cult, face-to-face dialogues among all affected parties, it is doubtful
whether citizenship status, if brought about through federal intervention,
can long be maintained. The responsibility to reciprocity, described below,
may offer hope for such a negotiation of social legitimacy.
298. Id.
299. Id. (emphasis in original).
300. See John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, The Colonization of Consciousness, in A
READER IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION 493, 507 (2002) (in the context of South
Africa, there exists two levels in the colonization of consciousness: conversion by an ideo-
logical message, and "inculcation of the hegemonic forms, the taken-for-granted signs and
practices, of the colonizing culture.").
301. JOHN SKORUPSKI, SYMBOL AND THEORY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THEORIES OF
RELIGION IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 101 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1976) ("Operative ac-
tions are performed in order to create or cancel a set of rights and obligations.").
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2. Responsibility to Reciprocity
If, as Garroutte notes, relationship to ancestry represents Native
American being, the second dimension of kinship, responsibility to recip-
rocity, indicates Native doing: what religious studies scholar Christopher
Jocks describes as the "ability to participate in kinship.' '30 2 To understand
this dimension I believe it is necessary to appreciate how very differently
indigenous communities and Euroamerican societies conceive the basis of
social obligation. For those acculturated in the Enlightenment's tradition
of atomistic agency, obligations arise paradigmatically through the free
actions of autonomous individuals, represented in the classic notion of
contract as a "bargained-for exchange of promises.
' 3
0
3
Tribal communities, on the other hand, often understand themselves
as existing in fundamental relationship with their physical surroundings;
not as societies floating in incidental or accidental relation to particular
geographic spaces, but as distinct peoples dwelling within a web of
physical, spiritual, and moral relationships with places. °4 Native American
spiritual traditions are often, though not always, site-specific, meaning that
the religious and cultural identities of the people, and their ethical
obligations, 3 ' depend upon particular places where the Original
Instructions-the purpose of the tribe for the world-can be
competently interpreted by the elders, medicine men and women, and
other qualified tribal members, or effectively performed in ceremonies of
renewal.30 6
302. See GARROUTTE, supra note 48, at 118, 129 (quoting Christopher Jocks, American
Indian Religious Traditions and the Academic Study of Religion:A Response to Sam Gill, 65 J. AM.
AcAD. RELIGION 169, 172 (1997)).
303. "Contract. An agreement between two or more persons which creates an obli-
gation to do or not to do a particular thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 291-92 (5th ed.
1979).
304. See KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE AMONG
THE WESTERN APACHE 3-153 (Univ. of N.M. Press 1996) (on Apache place-making); see also
id. at 106 ("dwelling is said to consist in the multiple 'lived relationships' that people main-
tain with places, for it is solely by virtue of these relationships that space acquires
meaning.").
305. Deloria writes, "Spatial thinking requires that ethical systems be related directly
to the physical world and real human situations, not abstract principles, are believed to be
valid at all times and under all circumstances. One could project, therefore, that space must
in a certain sense precede time as a consideration for thought." DELOPIA, supra note 261, at
72.
306. There is an extensive literature addressing the efforts of Native Americans to
negotiate their spiritual traditions within the constraints of Anglo-American law. See, e.g.,
Kristin A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for
Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1065 (2005) (arguing that "Indian nations
can assert that even as nonowners, they may have enforceable rights at sacred sites located
on federal public lands."); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Re-
sources on Public Lands, U. COLO. L. R-Ev. 413, 414 ("The land has represented an
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Further, for many tribes, dwelling implies engagement in highly in-
terpersonal relations with a broader ontology than that recognized by
Western philosophy and science: animals, plants, people, gods, geological
forms, meteorological events, celestial entities, and spirit beings, to name
but a few.307 This dwelling, and these relationships, constitute a web of life
which serves as the basis for reciprocal interactions. As Garroutte notes,
while social science defines kinship in terms of human descent, many Na-
tive Americans view kinship, and the obligations of kinship, much more
broadly to encompass all that is.3°s
The critical interpretation of what Deloria calls the "Indian atti-
tude" toward people, land, and other life forms does not require one to
bracket the truth or falsity of indigenous claims about reality, much less
deny them. The elders' accounts of aboriginal history, stories of origina-
tion (of the cosmos, people, animals, and other kin), the complex
medicines that keep the world in balance, and the social structures and
rituals that embody the teaching and continuation of the "Indian attitude"
cannot be challenged from within a critical hermeneutics oriented by the
assumptions of Radical Indigenism.
At the same time, it is appropriate to ask, from within one's tribal
community, to what extent the tribe's present-day understanding of in-
digenous kinship relations reflects Euroamerican biases of, for example,
space, time, history, and community.3°9 It is especially important in this
regard to examine the influence of Christianity on understandings of kin-
ship, where many tribal spiritual traditions for centuries came under the
unparalleled bulwark against the otherwise inevitable effects of colonization-tribal eradi-
cation and assimilation."). The leading case in this area remains Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-52 (1988) (Free Exercise Clause not impli-
cated where logging road's construction on government land would devastate tribal
cultures and religions but not coerce Indians to change their beliefs). But see Navajo Na-
tion v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 06-15371, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 5710, at *3, *46, *57-62
(9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2007) (distinguishing Lyng to find that government approval of devel-
opment permits violated rights of Navajo and Hopi under Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, where expansion of snowmaking on sacred San Francisco Peaks using
treated sewage effluent would devastate tribal cultures and religions).
307. Deloria expressly describes the relationship of humans and other species as one
of kinship: "The essence of the Indian attitude toward peoples, lands, and other life forms
is one of kinship relations in which no element of life can go unattached from human
society... .With respect to other life forms, this attitude manifests itself in what one could
call 'kinship' cycles of responsibility that exist between our species and other species." VINE
DELORIA, JR., Native American Spirituality, in FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN
AMERICA 131 (James Treat ed., Routledge 1999).
308. GARoutTE, supra note 48, at 132 ("Humans are simply one set of participants in
the vast cycles of giving and receiving, of covenant and celebration, that constitute rela-
tionship to a tribal kinship community.").
309. See, e.g., DELOIA, supra note 261, at 75-89, 111-128; see also DELORIA, supra note
307, at 145-61.
[VOL. 12:387
A Race or a Nation?
influence of missionaries.3 Indeed, the critical examination of such un-
derstandings of kinship may serve as an act of cultural recovery. Critical
assessment of traditional source material and dialogue with the commu-
nity and its elders can reveal where, for example, Western dichotomies
between irreconcilable "spiritual" and "material" worlds, "souls" and "bod-
ies," "rational animals" and "irrational nature," or incompatible "subjects"
and "objects" may have elided indigenous worldviews and attenuated the
scope of kinship responsibilities, including responsibilities of political par-
ticipation, that tribes may wish to resume, insofar as they can.
The "common spiritual cosmology '311 shared by many Cherokees,
often foregrounded by individual commitments to Christianity or the
Keetoowah Society, provides the basis for strong indigenous kinship rela-
tions which bear directly on Cherokee identity. Sturm's informants
emphasize that "[s]pirituality is the most important thing in the traditional
Cherokee world because we use it to maintain life as we know it and to
survive through periods of turmoil" and "[a] Cherokee has to be brought
up knowing their culture, the medicine way of life. They have to go out
into the woods and know roots and foods and medicine" but also state
that "[Cherokees] also need to be able to survive with European ways,"
and "Cherokee religion is real important to me.... Me and my family, we
visit with the medicine man and the little people. I know the difference
between good and bad medicine, even though I have a college degree.
312
For these Cherokees, negotiating Euroamerican "ways" occurs against the
background of a rich and expansive kinship system which implies rela-
tionships of reciprocity.
The Cherokee Nation in its Declaration of Designed Purpose appears
to allude to such a larger notion of kinship, when it states, in a section
captioned "Identity":
[T]he government of the Cherokee Nation acknowledges that
Cherokee identity has been formulated over time and consists
of shared patterns of behavior that include language, ceremony,
310. See, e.g., Marie Therese Archambault, Native Americans and Evangelization, in NA-
TIVE AND CHRISTIAN: INDIGENOUS VOICES ON RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA 132-53 (James Treat ed., Routledge 1996) (Native-Christian author arguing
that Native Americans should be "de-evangelized" in order to facilitate religious self-
determination); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49
STAN. L. REV. 773, 776-805 (1997) (presenting history of federal governmental policy to
Christianize Indians and suppress indigenous religious practices).
311. STuRM, supra note 67, at 127. See also MooNEY, supra note 138 (providing an
Euroamerican account of the Cherokee cosmology).
312. SmaRM, supra note 67, at 126-27. The reference to "the little people" or Yunwi
Tsunsdi, refers to a fixture of Cherokee culture, that "race of spirits" who inhabits Chero-
kee woodlands and offers assistance or harm depending on whether their customs and
privacy are respected. See MOONEY, supra note 138, at 333-34.
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customs, values, beliefs, traditions, wisdom and knowledge,
along with other tangible and intangible forces, that combined
313
are referred to as the Cherokee lifeways or culture.
More specifically, the Declaration declares that "[t]he Mission of the
Cherokee Nation is 'ga du gi'-working together as individuals, families
and communities for a quality of life for this and future generations by
promoting confidence, Cherokee culture and an effective sovereign gov-
ernment., 314 Chief Smith and his administration have made gad-du-gi the
organizing principle of national life. In his 2005 Status Report to the
Nation, Chief Smith stated:
[A]s Cherokees well know, the best way to get anything done
is the traditional way of working together, ga-du-gi. In order
to keep our communities strong now and into the next cen-
tury, we are applying the concept of ga-du-gi in every
department, program and business at the Cherokee Nation. To
do this we have passed a law that requires a self-help compo-
nent for all of our programs.... Community. Jobs. Language.
Deputy Principal Chief Joe Grayson and I continue our com-
mitment to the true community spirit of Cherokee people, ga-
du-gi, to providing economic opportunity, and to our distinct
Cherokee Culture.315
I would argue that ga-du-gi-"all working together"-is a particular
manifestation of a Cherokee kinship system which links citizens with that
larger world referenced by the Cherokee cosmology. As prosaic and
"Western" as a call for cooperation and self-help may seem to be, it would
be a mistake to infer from the Declaration or Status Report that either its
author or intended audience understands ga-du-gi as merely an exhorta-
tion to "pitch in and pull together": the invocation of a formative
Cherokee concept in the sacred Cherokee language would evoke for both
speaker and listener an obligation to realize their "designed purpose" for
the sake of the world.3 6
This second dimension of kinship, relationship to reciprocity, chal-
lenges Cherokees "by blood" and Freedmen's descendants who are
interested in citizenship to discuss and determine their respective roles in
313. Declaration of Designed Purpose, supra note 272.
314. Id.
315. Message from Principal Chief Chad Smith, Cherokee Nation Status Report 2005,
http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=SR&Name=SR2005&ID=NazMZK/vU/g=.
316. See Declaration of Designed Purpose, supra note 272 ("We are endowed with intel-
ligence, we are industrious, we are loyal, and we are spiritual but we are overlooking the
particular Cherokee mission on earth, for no man nor race is endowed with these qualifi-
cations without a designed purpose.").
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the world according to ga-du-gi as the social expression of the traditional
Cherokee cosmology, as interpreted by the elders and found in the tribe's
texts, stories, and communal structures. Many Freedmen's descendants
"possess as much if not more Cherokee culture" than "many [W]hite-
Cherokees enrolled in the tribe."31 7 As Marilyn Vann has said, Freedmen's
descendants "know a lot more about a stomp dance, hog fry, and wild on-
ion dinner than anything about Africa."3  This suggests that some
descendants may share assumptions with "blood" Cherokees regarding the
cosmos and its familial interconnections. There may be shared cultural
roots to sustain the moral imperatives of ga-du-gi. Stated differently, how
would Freedmen's descendants contribute to ga-du-gi, the up-building of
the Nation, and the articulation and performance of the Nation's "de-
signed purpose"? And what, in turn, are the obligations of ga-du-gi from
"blood" Cherokees to the descendants of (for some) their former slaves,
who were until recently their fellow citizens? A dialogue between these
groups, as difficult as it would be, could strive to identify and articulate
shared cultural roots to help them assess whether the political definition
of Cherokees today ought to continue to include citizenship for the
Freedmen's descendants.
CONCLUSION
To return to Marilyn Vann's pointed question, is the Cherokee Na-
tion "a race or a nation?" Clearly, it is a nation. But will it be a nation
based on race? At this crossroads in Cherokee history, the controversy in
the Cherokee Nation over the political status of the Freedmen's descen-
dants has tended to frame the options as a choice between "blood" or base
rolls: citizenship as a reflection of Cherokee lineal descent or citizenship as
a function of a legal regime embedded in the federal Dawes Rolls.
Though the two options intertwine in effect-the Dawes Rolls authorize
which "blood" will lead to citizenship-they are analytically distinct. As I
have attempted to show in this Article, neither alternative is adequate to
resolve the crisis of Cherokee political and social identity.
The rights of citizenship promised to Freedmen and their descen-
dants by the Treaty of 1866 and the 1866 amendments to the Cherokee
Constitution have been consistently and effectively resisted by tribal lead-
ership virtually since they were announced. The listing of Freedmen or
their descendants on the Dawes Rolls in the early twentieth century pro-
vided no protection against resistance to their citizenship rights, including
317. STuvm, supra note 67, at 196. Malcomson observes that "many of the [B]lack
slaves of Indians identified with Indian culture. They often spoke the tribal language. They
prepared Indian dishes and participated, however peripherally, in Indian festivities such as
the Cherokees' Green Corn celebration." MALCOMSON, supra note 220, at 98-99.
318. CLAUDIO SAUNT, BLACK, WHITE, AND INDIAN: RACE AND THE UNMAKING OF AN
AMERICAN FAMILY 65 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
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the right to vote in tribal elections, up to the day Lucy Allen was decided
in 2006 and Freedmen's descendants were recognized as citizens. That
Cherokees went to the polls in 2007 and amended their Constitution to
exclude Freedmen's descendants indicates both the strength of the Chero-
kee political process to effect the will of the people and the weakness of
the Dawes Rolls to secure rights promised in 1866.
On the other hand, biological definitions of Cherokee identity-
"blood"-based identities-are inextricably indebted to the effective his-
tory of colonialism and its race-based hierarchies. The ready adaptation
to and deployment of Euroamerican systems of racial classification by
Cherokees in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to Cherokee
slave-holding and strict slave codes that permitted Cherokee-White in-
termarriages but prohibited and punished severely relations of intimacy
between Cherokees and "people of color." The Cherokee construction
of a national identity after 1839 melded a racial commitment to the
preservation of Cherokee "blood" and the prosperity of the Cherokee
Nation. This "blood"-based sense of Cherokee identity fit well with the
race science of the nineteenth century and with the philosophy and
public policy of assimilation which guided the Dawes Commission in its
work of tribal enrollment and allotment of land. The resulting Dawes
Rolls established race-based categorizations of complex social and bio-
logical identities for both Native Americans and African Americans.
When, as now, the Cherokee Nation turns to the Dawes Rolls as its ex-
clusive authority for citizenship, it is perpetuating those categorizations
and their race-value significations by embedding them in the very body
of the Nation.
This Article has proposed that a version of the model of Radical
Indigenism created by sociologist Eva Garroutte could provide an
alternative to biology or legalism as the basis for Cherokee political
identity. Ancestry is rescued from biology when it is reconceived as a
mode of kinship. Law is saved from fetishism to the Dawes Rolls when
sovereignty is exercised to frame new citizenship criteria that are both
robust and flexible. Engaging the resources of Radical Indigenism would
require Cherokees "by blood" and Freedmen's descendants to participate
in a sustained and candid dialogue on Cherokee political identity from
within indigenous norms and authorities and the critical evaluation of
Cherokee history and culture.
The sovereign right of the Cherokee Nation to determine its cri-
teria for citizenship should never be denied or compromised by federal
intervention. The "hard case" of whether to sustain a decision of the
Cherokee Nation to exclude the Freedmen's descendants, were the issue
to reach federal court or the floor of Congress, would surely "make bad
law." The wise use of Cherokee sovereignty, however, counsels patience,
not a rush to the polls. It requires honest, sustained, and, no doubt, diffi-
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cult dialogue, not politicking, and the critical reinterpretation of cultural
resources in the service of kinship, not the blind reproduction of divisive
racial hegemonies-in short, ga-du-gi, "all working together."
